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I. Introduction
In 2001, William Greider of The Nation issued a scathing
indictment' of the investment protection chapter (Chapter 11) of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).2 He
characterized the investor-state arbitration mechanism of Chapter
11' as an offshore legal venue whose "secret" proceedings are
shielded from public scrutiny, and especially condemned Chapter
11's guarantee against expropriation' as a doctrine which
"cripple[s] the regulatory state."' Greider illustrated his point with
the notorious Chapter 11 claim filed in 1999 against the United
States by Methanex, a Canadian methanol producer. Methanex,
seeking close to $1 billion' in damages," complained before a
NAFTA tribunal that measures taken by California to protect its
water supply from harmful contaminants effectively expropriated
Methanex's investment in the U.S. fuel additives market.9 Greider
I William Greider, The Right and US Trade Law: Invalidating the 20th Century,
THE NATION, Oct. 15, 2001, at 21.
2 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107
Stat. 2057 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
3 NAFTA Chapter 11 allows an investor that is a national or enterprise of one of
the other parties to the treaty to bring a claim in arbitration against the host state for a
breach of Chapter 11. See id arts. 1115-38. See infra notes 232-243 and accompanying
text for a discussion of investor-state arbitration.
4 NAFTA Chapter 11 prohibits a host state from expropriating investments unless
done for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with due
process of law, and upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. This
prohibition on expropriation encompasses both direct and indirect takings, including
regulatory measures that are "tantamount" to an expropriation. Id. art. 1110.
5 Greider, supra note 1, at 21-22.
6 Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005) (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. Aug. 3, 2005) (final award), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.
7 Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars.
8 Methanex sought approximately $970 million in damages, plus interest and
costs. See id at 1345.
9 See id at 1371. The State of California banned the use and sale of the fuel
additive methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE). Methanol is one component of MTBE. Id.
at 1345. The ban was issued in response to the risk that the use of MTBE in gasoline
posed to California's water supply, several sources of which had been shut down due to
MTBE contamination. Id. at 1411. Methanex argued, among other things, that this
measure was discriminatory and was "tantamount to an expropriation" of its share of the
U.S. fuel additive market. Id. at 1371. Although Methanex ultimately lost its claim and
was even charged with all legal and administrative costs of the arbitration, see id. at
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argued that Chapter 11, by vesting such expansive rights in the
hands of foreign investors like Methanex, was like a "slow-ticking
time bomb in the politics of globalization."'o
Ironically, the treaty provisions that Greider's critique targets
are similar to provisions in the bilateral investment treaties
(BITs)" that the United States had been concluding with Senegal,
Cameroon, Morocco, Bangladesh, and other countries for up to a
decade prior to the conclusion of NAFTA.12 It was only during the
1462-64, the mere existence of the claim has been cited by critics of Chapter 11, such as
Greider, as an example of the expansive rights Chapter 11 grants to foreign investors.
See also Detlav Vagts, Foreward to THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, at xxv (Waibel, Kaushal, Chung & Balchin eds., 2010)
(describing the Methanex dispute as the "most unnerving" of the Chapter II claims,
setting off "alarm bells in Ottowa, Washington, and Mexico City"). See infra notes 131-
148 and accompanying text for a further discussion on Methanex.
10 Greider, supra note 1, at 21.
II An investment treaty (typically, but not always, bilateral) is an international
agreement between states whereby each signatory state undertakes to accord certain
protections to investments made by nationals of the other state. BITs also usually
contain a commitment by each signatory state to allow investors who are nationals of the
other state to enforce BIT obligations against it through arbitration, either before the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or before an ad
hoc tribunal. For a comprehensive discussion of the history, content, and interpretation
of BITs, see JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES (Oxford Univ.
Press 2010) [hereinafter SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES].
BITs are distinguishable from free trade agreements (FTAs) such as NAFTA.
Whereas BITs only address investment protection, FTAs liberalize trade between or
among the contracting states. Many FTAs contain an investment chapter, such as
Chapter 11 of NAFTA. The investment chapter of an FTA is the functional equivalent
of a BIT. For example, as discussed below, the provisions of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT
were largely based on the investment chapters of the FTAs the United States had
previously concluded with Chile and Singapore. See infra notes 185-198 and
accompanying text. At times this article uses the term BIT to encompass both
investment treaties and the investment chapters of FTAs.
12 The first wave of U.S. BITs was negotiated during the early 1980s: the U.S.
signed its treaty with Senegal in 1983, with Morocco in 1985, and with Cameroon and
Bangladesh in 1986. See United States Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/1 I 17402.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2012)
[hereinafter U.S. BITs]; see also KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 31-33 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009) [hereinafter VANDEVELDE,
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS] (discussing the history of the first wave of U.S. BIT
negotiations). Although there are differences between NAFTA Chapter 11 and the early
U.S. BITs, see infra note 81, all of the treaties contain strong investor protections. In
particular, like Chapter 11, the 1982 model BIT contained provisions: (i) calling for
binding arbitration of disputes between the investor and the host state and (ii)
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implementation of NAFTA, when the United States began to find
itself on the defending side of investment arbitration claims, that
these investor protection provisions became controversial.'3
Additionally, the politics of globalization to which Greider refers 4
eventually influenced the substance of a new generation of BITs,
moderating some of the more controversial provisions.
The political philosopher John Rawls famously advocated that
fairness is central to justice," and fair institutions are those that
derive from the "original position," an imaginary state where
hypothetical rulemakers have no knowledge of their vested
interests and of how a chosen rule might affect them-what Rawls
referred to as operating under a "veil of ignorance." 6
Traditionally, the vested interests of states concluding BITs fell
into two categories: those on the side of capital-exporting states,
with an interest in adopting strong protections for foreign
investors; and those on the side of capital-importing states, with an
interest not only in attracting foreign investment but also in
attempting to preserve host country sovereignty and authority to
promote the public interest.17 For example, during the early years
of U.S. BIT practice, the government concluded treaties with
weaker, capital-importing states that contained unambiguously
guaranteeing against host state measures that, directly or indirectly, are "tantamount to
an expropriation." See VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra, at Appendix A,
arts. 3(1), 7. Under the 1982 model BIT, the right to bring a claim to investor-state
arbitration was subject to any dispute settlement provision agreed to between the investor
and the host state; however, U.S. negotiators soon revised the text to place the election of
remedies within the sole discretion of the investor. Id. at 579-80.
13 See VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 64-65.
14 See supra text accompanying note 10.
15 See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 53 (2009) (referring to Rawls's
"foundational idea that justice has to be seen in terms of the demands of fairness").
16 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-19 (rev. ed. 1999). The idea behind the
original position is to use pure procedural justice to ensure fairness. The veil of
ignorance "nulliffies] the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and
tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage." Id. at
118. Behind the veil of ignorance, a party is unaware of his class position, social status,
natural abilities, or the particular circumstances of his own society, including its
economic or political situation. See id Amartya Sen describes Rawls's conception of
the original position as "an imagined situation of primordial equality, when the parties
involved have no knowledge of their personal identities, or their respective vested
interests, within the group as a whole." SEN, supra note 15, at 54.
17 See SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 11, at 91-96.
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robust pro-investor protections.' 8
Over the past decade or so, however, the line between capital-
exporting and capital-importing state has increasingly blurred, and
the calculus for states negotiating BITs has become less certain.' 9
To an extent, therefore, states are moving closer to the "original
position."20 The event that first situated the United States as a
host-country state under a BIT was the conclusion of NAFTA
Chapter 1 1' The experience of the United States as a respondent
to claims brought to arbitration by investors such as Methanex
significantly affected the development of a new generation of U.S.
BITs that better balance the interests of host states against those of
foreign investors.22 Similarly, as emerging market economies
(EMEs)2 3 such as India and China have become significant
exporters of capital, these countries have increasingly
18 See infra Part II.A.
19 See J.E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, 7(1) TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT., Apr. 2010,
at 8-9, available at http://www.law.nyu.edulecmdlvl/groups/public/@nyu_1aw-website
faculty faculty_profiles jalvarez/documents/documents/ecmpro_065335.pdf.
20 See RAWLS, supra note 16, at 15-19 (discussing Rawls's theory of the "original
position").
21 See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Part II.B. Others have made the argument that the U.S. experience
under NAFTA Chapter 11 affected its subsequent BIT practice. See Alvarez, supra note
19, at 8-9; VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 64-65, 70-74;
David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 679, 685-91 (2004)
[hereinafter Gantz, Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions]; Gilbert Gagn6 & Fr6d6ric
Morin, The Evolving American Policy on Investment Protection: Evidence from Recent
FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 357, 360-67 (2006).
Although this article focuses on the effect of NAFTA Chapter 11 on U.S. practice,
the experience of investor-state arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11 affected Canadian
BIT practice as well. See generally C6line Ldvesque, Influences on the Canadian FIPA
Model and the US Model BIT: NAFTA Chapter 11 and Beyond, 44 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
249 (2006) (discussing influences, including experiences under NAFTA Chapter 11, on
Canada's 2004 model foreign investment protection and promotion agreement and on the
U.S. 2004 model BIT).
23 The term "emerging market economies" (EMEs) refers to all economies not
classified as developed economies by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). See Persephone Economou & Karl P. Sauvant, From the FDI
Triad to Multiple FDI Poles?, COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES, July 18, 2011,
http://www.vcc.columbia.edulcontent/fdi-triad-multiple-fdi-poles. A list of developed
economies can be found at UNCTAD, UNCTAD HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS 2010, at xiv,
U.N. Doc. TD/STAT.35, U.N. Sales No. B.10.TI.D.1 (2010).
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implemented BITs that protect their investors abroad.2 4 Indian
automaker Tata Motors' 2008 acquisition of the venerable British
automaker Jaguar2 5 vividly illustrates how the line between
capital-exporting and capital-importing states has blurred. While
certain developing country leaders denounce BITs and investment
arbitration-witness the withdrawals of Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela from ICSID2 6-developing countries with the largest
amounts of outward foreign direct investment (FDI), such as India
and China, continue to conclude BITs and FTAs with investment
chapters. 27 Although Brazil has not yet ratified a single BIT,28 its
emergent status as a capital exporting country should lead to a
greater acceptance of BITs and investment arbitration in Brazil
over time.
This article examines this convergence in BIT practice. It
focuses on (i) the impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 on the
development of the current generation of U.S. BITs and FTAs and
(ii) the changing dynamics of FDI and investment protection in
EMEs. It suggests that these converging trends, a function of
states operating behind a "veil of ignorance,"29 are having and
should continue to have a moderating influence on the content of
BITs. Part II outlines the evolution of U.S. BIT practice from its
origins to the current generation of U.S. BITs and FTAs. Part III
discusses the recent emergence of EMEs as significant exporters
of FDI, the effects of this trend on these countries' BIT practices,
and the policy implications of these developments. Part IV
concludes.
II. Evolution of U.S. BIT Practice
A. BIT Program Origins
Although the earliest BITs date back to 1959,30 the United
24 See infra Part III.B.
25 See James Surowiecki, The Tata Invasion, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 28, 2008, at
27.
26 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
27 See infra Part III.B.
28 See infra notes 382-406 and accompanying text.
29 See generally RAWLS, supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
30 The first BITs were concluded by Germany with Pakistan and the Dominican
Republic. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51
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States only began developing its own BIT program in the 1980s,
and it was not until 1986 that Congress ratified the first wave of
treaties." Although the titles and preambles of BITs generally
suggest that the purpose of such treaties is the mutual promotion
and protection of investments,32 in fact the overriding U.S. policy
behind developing the BIT program was to protect existing
investments made by United States nationals abroad.33 Since
customary international law was inadequate to provide meaningful
protection to foreign investors,34 the United States and other
capital-exporting countries concluded BITs with developing
countries35 in order to create binding international commitments
HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 433 (2010) [hereinafter Salacuse, Emerging Global Regime].
31 See VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 30. Vandevelde
describes the U.S. Department of State's Legal Adviser's Office as a "driving force"
behind the development of the U.S. program. Id. at 31-32.
32 See SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 11, at 109.
33 See VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 31 (describing
U.S. policy as "neither to encourage nor to discourage investment overseas, but rather to
ensure stable and transparent treatment of such investment when it occurred").
34 See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 67, 68-70 (2005). Salacuse and Sullivan identify four shortcomings of customary
international law relating to investment protection: (i) the nonexistence of standards on
certain issues of concern to foreign investors, such as the right of an investor to effect
monetary transfers from a host country; (ii) the vagueness and inconsistency of certain
standards, such as the amount of compensation due to an investor in the event of
expropriation; (iii) the controversy surrounding issues such as expropriation; and (iv) the
lack of an effective enforcement mechanism for investors to pursue claims against host
countries. Id.
35 Prior to the United States' signing of NAFTA in December 1992, it had
concluded BITs with twenty-two countries, all either developing countries or formerly
socialist economies. U.S. BITs, supra note 12 (listing as countries with pre-existing
BITs: Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Czech Republic, Egypt, Grenada, Haiti, Kazakhstan,
Morocco, Panama, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and
Turkey).
The United States also concluded FTAs with Israel and Canada during the 1980s.
However, the Israel-U.S. FTA does not include an investment chapter. See Agreement
on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area between the Government of Israel and the
Government of the United States of America, U.S.-Isr., Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 647,
available at http://tcc.export.gov/TradeAgreements/AllTrade Agreements/
exp 005439.asp. Although the Canada-U.S. FTA includes an investment chapter, the
chapter does not grant foreign investors the right to bring investment arbitration claims
against the host state. See Canada-United States: Free-Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.,
1572012]
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where customary international law standards were inconclusive or
non-existent. Professor Jeswald Salacuse argues that, collectively,
BITs can be seen as an undertaking by capital-exporting states to
create an international regime for the protection of investment.36
To this end, BITs concluded during this period typically
included the following investment protections3 7 (examples are
based on the text of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, 8 which was
concluded in 1991):
* Non-discriminatory treatment. Requires the host state
to accord investments, 3 9 and activities associated with
investments, the better of national treatment and most-
favored nation treatment (subject to enumerated
exceptions listed in the treaty).40
* Fair and equitable treatment. Requires the host state
to accord investments "fair and equitable treatment"
and "full protection and security," in no case "less than
that required by international law."4 1 As discussed
Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1989, 27 I.L.M. 281.
36 See Salacuse, Emerging Global Regime, supra note 30, at 436-37. Salacuse
borrows from international relations theory to argue that the existing body of BITs
constitutes a regime, defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international
relations." Id at 431 (quoting Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables in POWER, THE STATE, AND
SOVEREIGNTY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 113, 113 (Stephen D. Krasner ed.,
2009)).
37 For a comprehensive discussion of the specific protections provided in the early
U.S. BITs, see, for example, VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at
31-41.
38 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg.,
Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 [hereinafter U.S.-Arg. BIT].
39 The term "investment" refers to investments owned and controlled by a national
of a party to the treaty, and is broadly defined as including, among other things, "any
right conferred by law or contract," intellectual property rights, and "a claim to money or
a claim to performance having economic value and directly related to an investment."
Id. art. 1(1).
40 Id. art. 11(1). National treatment refers to an obligation of the host state to treat
foreign investments no less favorably than it treats its own nationals or companies,
whereas most-favored nation treatment refers to an obligation of the host state to treat
investments from the other party no less favorably than it treats investments from any
third country. Id.
41 Id. art. 11(2).
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below,4 2 some tribunals have interpreted this language
as setting a customary international law floor on the
fair and equitable treatment standard and establishing
an independent, higher standard of treatment to be
met.43
* "Prompt, adequate and effective compensation" in the
event of expropriation.44 Prohibits the host state from
expropriating investments unless done for a public
purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance
with due process of law, and upon payment of "prompt,
adequate and effective compensation." 45  The
prohibition on expropriation encompasses both direct
and indirect takings, including regulatory measures that
are "tantamount" to an expropriation.4 6
* Free transferability of payments. Requires the host
state to permit all currency transfers, including returns
on investment, principal and interest payments on a
loan, proceeds from the liquidation of an investment,
and other such payments, to be made freely and
without delay, in a "freely usable" currency (such as
the U.S. dollar or the euro).4 7 This obligation is subject
to very limited exceptions, such as income tax
withholding requirements, and protecting creditors'
rights in the host country.4 8
* Prohibition on performance requirements as a
condition to investment. Prohibits the host state from
conditioning investment approval on performance
requirements, such as achieving minimum export levels
or requiring that goods and services be sourced
locally.49
42 See infra notes 109-114 and accompanying text (discussing Metalclad).
43 As discussed below, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT appears to narrow the fair and
equitable treatment standard. See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
44 U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 38, art. IV(1).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. art. V.
48 Id
49 Id art. 11(5).
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* Investor right to arbitrate disputes with the host state.
Allows an investor who is a national or entity of the
other party to the treaty to bring to arbitration (either to
ICSIDo or to ad hoc arbitration) any investment
dispute with the host state relating to (i) an investment
agreement with or investment authorization by the host
state or (ii) a breach by the host state of the BIT.s' This
provision is the most important investor protection in a
BIT, as it accords investors a private right of action
against the host state, a right that is unavailable to
private parties in other areas of international law.52
The preceding discussion highlights what the United States, as
a capital-exporting country, stood to gain from concluding BITs.
Less evident is why capital-importing countries such as Argentina,
50 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) was
established by the World Bank during the 1960s out of a belief that the existence of a
neutral tribunal to resolve disputes would mitigate political risk, thereby encouraging
foreign investment in developing countries. It is a neutral arbitral body in the sense that
it is detached from any system of national law, but its awards are directly enforceable in
the states that are party to the ICSID Convention. See Lucy REED, JAN PAULSSON &
NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 1, 5 (2003). ICSID's jurisdiction is
limited to resolving investment disputes between a host state that is a party to the ICSID
Convention and a foreign investor, where the parties have consented in writing to submit
the dispute to ICSID. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States art. 25(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. For more information on the ICSID, see
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001).
51 See U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 38, art. VII. If it is not possible to settle the
dispute amicably, and if six months have elapsed from the time the dispute arose, the
investor may submit the dispute to the host state's domestic courts for resolution,
following any dispute settlement mechanism specified in the contract, if any, with the
host state or utilizing the investor-state arbitration mechanism provided for in the BIT.
Id. art. VII(2)-(3). The arbitration provision of the BIT is treated as an offer to arbitrate
by the host state, which the investor accepts when it submits a request for arbitration.
REED, PAULSSON & BLACKABY, supra note 50, at 35.
52 For example, compare this provision with the rules of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes arts. 4.3, 4.7, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (referring to a WTO
member's right to request establishment of a panel if consultations are not successful).
Only WTO member states have standing to bring a claim to WTO dispute settlement.
Id.; see also BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 87 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2001) ("Only
governments have legal standing to bring cases to the WTO.").
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Haiti, or Bangladesh, would conclude BITs with the United States.
Several explanations have been offered. It is commonly
acknowledged that capital-importing states enter into BITs in
order to promote foreign investment." In a 1998 article, Andrew
Guzman identified the paradox that many developing countries in
the past collectively fought against strict customary international
law standards on expropriation, but, individually, have undertaken
strong investor-protection commitments by concluding BITs.54 He
explained this paradox by suggesting that developing countries
face a "prisoners' dilemma" in which, by concluding BITs, an
individual developing country "defects" from the group in order to
make itself a more attractive target of foreign investment in
comparison with other developing countries." Jeswald Salacuse
and Nicholas Sullivan have characterized a BIT between a capital-
53 See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 666-71 (1998);
Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 34, at 77; cf Roberto Echandi, What Do Developing
Countries Expect from the International Investment Regime, in THE EVOLVING
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS 5-6 (Jos6 E.
Alvarez & Karl P. Sauvant eds., 2011) (acknowledging that most literature analyzes the
expectations of developing countries regarding BITs in terms of the ability of these
countries to attract foreign investment, but observing that the current situation is more
complex).
54 Guzman, supra note 53, at 642.
55 Id. at 666-67. Guzman argues that, by making credible commitments to
potential foreign investors, developing countries that conclude BITs can attract greater
amounts of investment, albeit at the expense of other developing countries. Id at 669-
70.
Despite the accepted wisdom that capital-importing countries enter into BITs in
order to attract capital, it is unclear whether BITs are effective to this end. Empirical
studies of the effect of BITs on foreign investment are inconclusive. See Kevin P.
Gallagher & Melissa B.L. Birch, Do Investment Agreements Attract Investment?
Evidence from Latin America, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND
INVESTMENT FLOWS 308-09 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) [hereinafter
THE EFFECT OF TREATIES] (finding no evidence that signing investment agreements with
the United States results in greater investment); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, The Impact on Foreign Direct Investment of BITs in THE EFFECT OF
TREATIES, supra, at 347-48 (concluding that BITs "appear to play a minor and secondary
role in influencing FDI flows"); cf Jason Yackee, Do BITs Really Work? Revisiting the
Empirical Link Between Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment, in THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES, supra, at 391 (questioning whether large-n statistical studies of
aggregate FDI flows are the best means of empirically addressing the question of the
effect of BITs on FDI).
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exporting and capital-importing country as a "grand bargain," a
promise by the host state to protect the capital invested in
exchange for the future prospect of additional capital. 6
At least throughout the 1980s, a BIT concluded with the
United States looked more like a contract of adhesion than a
"grand bargain."5 7 According to accounts of former State
Department attorney-advisers, at that time the United States
presented BITs to developing countries on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis." With evident sarcasm, Professor Jos6 Alvarez describes
his days as a State Department lawyer during the 1980s as the
"glory days-when BITs were BITs and real tough BIT
negotiators were negotiating strong, testosterone fuelled-
treaties."" He suggested that a BIT's reference to "reciprocal"
protection of investments was "something of a fraud,"60 and
described as ludicrous the notion that BIT negotiations between
the United States and its developing-country counterparts were
conducted as if between sovereign equals. Professor Kenneth
Vandevelde similarly refers to U.S. negotiations during that time
as uncompromising.6 2  This approach stemmed from the
government's desire to build a uniform body of state practice in
international law that was supportive of foreign investment.63
Accordingly, the U.S. position was "generally intransigent," which
resulted in a relatively small number of BITs being concluded with
the United States during the 1980s. 64 During the 1990s, however,
56 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 34, at 77. In a recent article, Salacuse identifies
other possible motivations for capital-importing countries to sign BITs: relationship
building; economic liberalization; encouraging domestic investment; and strengthening
rule of law within the country. Salacuse, Emerging Global Regime, supra note 30, at
440-41.
57 See Alvarez, supra note 19, at 5 (explaining the United States' unwillingness to
compromise regarding to the provisions of BITs in the 1980s).
58 See id.
59 See id at 3.
60 Id.
61 Specifically, Alvarez stated, "[t]he idea that the United States-Grenada BIT
negotiations - conducted three years after the United States invaded that island and
toppled its government to rescue some U.S. medical students - were conducted among
'sovereign equals' seems worthy of a Monty Python skit" Id at 5.
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notwithstanding the imbalance of bargaining power that continued
to exist between BIT parties, the number of BITs concluded
worldwide more than quadrupled, from 446 concluded BITs in
1990 to 1941 BITs one decade later.6 5
To summarize, during the early years of the U.S. BIT program,
the United States signed treaties with relatively poor countries
whose domestic companies were unlikely to export capital to the
United States. Whereas the overriding goal of the U.S. BIT
program was to protect foreign investment, the objective of the
developing countries that concluded BITs with the United States
was generally to attract foreign investment. However, as
discussed below, sovereign objectives behind concluding BITs are
significantly more complex today than they were twenty or so
years ago.
B. NAFTA Chapter 11 and its Effects on U.S. BIT Practice
The popularity of BITs that prevailed during much of the
1990s eventually gave way to a backlash.6 6 In Latin America, this
backlash was triggered in part by Argentina's devastating financial
crisis. Argentina concluded dozens of BITs during the 1990s. 67
Consequently, in the aftermath of the crisis, the government found
itself before ICSID and other arbitration tribunals, defending
dozens of claims brought by investors complaining of the
measures that Argentina took in response to the crisis. 68
According to one observer, if Argentina were presented with these
same BITs today, "it is nearly certain" that it would not enter into
65 See Quantitative Data on Bilateral Investment Treaties and Double Taxation
Treaties, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.unctad.org/TemplatesfWebFlyer.asp?intltemlD=3150&lang=1 (last visited
Oct. 7, 2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Quantitative Data].
66 Oscar M. Garibaldi, Carlos Calvo Redivivus: The Rediscovery of the Calvo
Doctrine in the Era of Investment Treaties, 3(5) TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1, 24 (2006)
(providing a timeline of the backlash of traditional BITs in Latin America).
67 During the 1990s, Argentina concluded fifty-three BITs. See Organization of
American States Foreign Trade Information System, Information on Argentina: Bilateral
Investment Treaties, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/ARG/ARGBITS-e.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
68 Of the 390 known investment treaty arbitration claims, 51 have been against
Argentina. See UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
HA ISSUES NOTE No. 1 (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20113en.pdf.
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them. 69  Elsewhere in Latin America, populist leaders made
dramatic gestures against investment claims, or the threat of such
claims, in their respective countries. In 2007, the Morales
government provided notice to the World Bank that Bolivia would
be the first state to withdraw from the ICSID Convention.,
Ecuador followed suit in 2009." In 2008, Venezuela gave notice
that it would terminate a Venezuela-Netherlands BIT that had
been frequently relied upon by multinationals in structuring
Venezuelan investments,7 2 and in 2012, Venezuela announced that
69 Garibaldi, supra note 66, at 3. Garibaldi argues that the Calvo Doctrine is being
rediscovered in Latin America as an intellectually respectable and traditionally consistent
political justification for opposing BITs. The Calvo Doctrine, attributed to Argentine
jurist Carlos Calvo, is based on the premise that foreign investors must be treated no
more favorably than domestic citizens, and opposes intervention by a foreign
government to aid one of its investors as an impermissible interference in the internal
affairs of the host state. Id. at 6-8. Garibaldi refers to the Calvo Doctrine as representing
the "obverse" of the merits of BITs. Id. at 4.
70 See ICSID Convention, supra note 50; see also Damon Vis-Dunbar, Luke Eric
Peterson & Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Bolivia Notifies World Bank of Withdrawal from
ICSID, Pursues BIT Revisions, IISD INv. TREATY NEWS (May 9, 2007)
http://bilaterals.org/spip.php?article8221. Bolivia's withdrawal may have been triggered
by threats of arbitration by foreign investors in response to moves by the government to
nationalize certain sectors of the economy. See id Memories of the notorious Aguas del
Tunari dispute, a controversial ICSID arbitration claim brought by the water
conglomerate Bechtel against Bolivia, may have also played a role. For a history of that
dispute, see, for example, William Finnegan, Leasing the Rain, THE NEW YORKER, Apr.
8, 2002, at 43.
71 See Luke Eric Peterson, Ecuador Becomes Second State to Exit ICSID, INv.
ARB. REP. (July 17, 2009), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/EcuadorExit (last visited
Oct. 7, 2012) (subscription required). In addition to at least six investment treaty claims
brought against Ecuador before non-ICSID tribunals, thirteen investor-state claims have
been brought against Ecuador through ICSID. Id. In September 2009, two months after
the Correa regime provided its notice of withdrawal from ICSID, Chevron commenced
investor-state arbitration proceedings against Ecuador under the Ecuador-U.S. BIT,
alleging improprieties in environmental litigation conducted against it in Ecuador courts.
For background to the Lago Agrio litigation and Chevron's request for investment
arbitration, see Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 388-91 (2d Cir. 2011).
72 See Luke Eric Peterson, Venezuela Surprises the Netherlands with Termination
Notice for BIT, INv. ARB. REP. (May 16, 2008),
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20091001_93 (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (subscription
required). Numerous multinational oil companies have structured their Venezuelan
investments using Dutch-registered companies, and several have filed expropriation
claims in arbitration against Venezuela in reliance on the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT.
Id.
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it would be withdrawing from ICSID.73 Among other factors, the
process of defending against a growing number of investment
arbitration claims prompted these governments to reevaluate the
relative costs and benefits of BITs.7 4
Although less extreme, a re-evaluation has taken place in the
United States as well." The event that precipitated this
reevaluation was the implementation of NAFTA Chapter 11. For
the first time, during the mid-to-late 1990s, the United States
experienced investment arbitration from the other side of the
bargain, as a host state to foreign investment from Canada.76 As of
January 1994, when NAFTA went into effect, the United States
was by far Canada's largest foreign direct investor (and still is).n
Similarly, during the same period, Canadian companies were the
second-highest exporters of FDI to the United States. As a
73 Venezuela Foreign Ministry Says It Has Filed to Depart World Arbitration
Panel, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB. (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?Categoryld=10717&Articleld=466009.
74 See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 72 (referencing multiple instances of threatened
arbitration as a possible reason for Venezuela's termination notice).
75 See Alvarez, supra note 19 (describing the cautious attitude adopted by the
United States toward BITs after NAFTA).
76 Similarly, Canada found itself, for the first time, defending against investment
claims brought against it by U.S. investors. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov't of Canada,
401 I.L.M. 1408 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Nov. 13, 2000) (partial award under
NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/SDMeyers-
1stPartialAward.pdf.
77 As of the end of 1993, just before NAFTA went into effect, stocks of FDI from
the United States into Canada were at 90.6 billion Canadian dollars, well over half of the
total FDI stocks for that year. See Foreign Direct Investments (Stocks) in Canada,
FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE CAN. (Aug. 2012),
http://www.international.gc.caleconomist-economiste/assets/pdfs/Datalinvestments-
investissements/FDI by Country/FDI stocks-Inward byCountry-ENG.pdf. As of
April 2011, the United States remained Canada's largest foreign investor. Id.
78 Canada is currently the eighth largest exporter of FDI into the U.S. See David
Payne & Fenwick Yu, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, U.S. DEPT. OF
COM. ECON. & STAT., Admin. Issue Brief #02-11, fig. 6 (June 2011), available at
http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/news/documents/fdiesaissuebriefno2061411 fin
al.pdf. However, as of the end of 1993, just before NAFTA went into effect, Canada
was ranked second. See Mahnaz Fahim-Nader, U.S. Business Enterprises Acquired or
Established by Foreign Direct Investors in 1993, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 50, 56
tbl. 5.2 (May 1994), available at
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/internat/fdinvest/1994/0594ii.pdf. Investment outlays by
Canadian companies into U.S. affiliates for that year stood at just under $4 billion, the
second highest level by country after the U.K. Id.
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former attorney-adviser to the State Department observed, the
United States "took a very big step into the unknown" when it
concluded NAFTA Chapter IL" Although the United States had
concluded numerous BITs by the time it signed NAFTA, it had
never done so with a state that had so much investment in the
United States."
As previously noted, NAFTA Chapter 11 contains investment
protection provisions that parallel those contained in the BITs
previously concluded by the United States. Although there are
differences in the specific content of some of the provisions,"'
each of the investment protection commitments described above82
with respect to BITs can also be found in NAFTA Chapter 11.
In other words, by concluding NAFTA, the United States, for the
first time, agreed to grant to a significant capital-exporting state
both commitments to protect investments and standing to foreign
investors to bring arbitration claims against the United States for
breach of those commitments. Although the U.S. negotiators of
NAFTA may not have fully appreciated the consequences of this
undertaking,8 4 over time they would. Since 1994, when NAFTA
79 Mark Clodfelter, US. State Department Participation in International
Economic Dispute Resolution, 42 S. TEx. L. REV. 1273, 1283 (2001), quoted in Gantz,
Evolution of FTA Investment Provision, supra note 22, at 685.
80 Id.
81 Examples of the changes found in NAFTA Chapter 11 (as compared to the U.S.-
Argentina BIT provisions described above) include: (i) the addition of an article
acknowledging that the parties should not encourage investment by relaxing
environmental, health or safety measures [art. 1114]; (ii) more detailed commitments
regarding the prohibition on performance requirements, but also a carve-out that tracks
some of the exceptions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) relating
to health and safety measures, environmental measures, and measures to ensure
compliance with domestic law [art. 1106(6)]; and (iii) a more detailed investor-state
arbitration provision that among other things requires the investor to provide ninety days
advance notice of investment claims [art. 1119] and imposes a three year limitation
period on investor claims [art. 1116(2)]. NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1114, 1106(6),
1116(2), 1119.
82 See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
83 See NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1102-04 (non-discriminatory treatment), art.
1110 (expropriation), art. 1102 (transfers), art. 1106 (performance requirements), arts.
1115-38 (investor-state arbitration).
84 Vandevelde writes that early U.S. BIT negotiations were conducted with little
regard to the possibility that investor claims might be brought against the United States:
U.S. policy makers during the initial formulation of the model negotiating text
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went into effect, investors have filed dozens of arbitration claims
against Mexico, Canada, and the United States, alleging violations
of Chapter 11.8" These claims, including the Methanex claim
described in Part 1, have attracted notoriety and some criticism,
and eventually were instrumental in shaping subsequent U.S. BIT
practice." Several of the claims that have most notably affected
attitudes in the United States towards BITs and investment
arbitration are discussed below.87
1. NAFTA Chapter 11 Claims
Two of the first Chapter 11 claims, Ethyl Corp. v. Government
of Canada" and Metalclad v. United Mexican States,8 9 involved
U.S. claimants but nonetheless attracted the attention of
environmental and other public interest organizations concerned
about corporate power to challenge environment- and health-
related regulation.9 0 In Ethyl, a U.S.-based investor and producer
of methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT),
challenged a Canadian law, the Manganese-based Fuel Additives
Act, that banned the inter-provincial trade in or transport of
MMT. 9' MMT is a fuel additive that contains manganese, a
and the first wave of negotiations rarely discussed the extent to which BIT
provisions might hinder U.S. treatment of foreign investment. In those days,
BIT policy assumed a world in which investment flows were outward from the
United States.
VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 50.
85 According to the State Department website, to date, forty-three investment
arbitration claims have been filed against the NAFTA parties under Chapter 11.
Seventeen of these claims were filed against the United States, all but one involving
Canadian claimants. See NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/1/c3439.htm (last visited Oct 8, 2012).
86 See, e.g., Greider, supra note 1.
87 See infra notes 259-310 and accompanying text.
88 Ethyl Corp. v. Gov't of Can., 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA Chap. 11 Trib. June 24,
1998) (award on jurisdiction under NAFTA/UNCITRAL).
89 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002).
90 PUB. CITIZEN & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-
STATE CASES: BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY 3-4, 9-10, 13-14 (Public Citizen's Global
Trade Watch ed., 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFl86.PDF.
91 Ethyl Corp., 38 I.L.M. at 710, T 5.
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neurotoxin banned for use in gasoline in the United States.92 Ethyl
argued that the Act was discriminatory, that it effectively
expropriated its Canadian investment, and that it violated Chapter
1I's prohibition on performance requirements.9 3 Ethyl filed a
notice of intent to submit an arbitral claim in September 1996,
when Canada's Parliament was still deliberating the proposed
legislation (the Act entered into force in June 1997).94 When the
arbitral tribunal issued an award upholding its jurisdiction to hear
the dispute, the Canadian government settled Ethyl's claim by
agreeing to pay Ethyl $13 million and to withdraw the Act.9 5 Ethyl
was particularly significant because of its timing: observers were
troubled by what looked like a coercive move by a corporate
investor to influence the legislative process by threatening to bring
a Chapter 11 claim.9 6 The timing of the Ethyl dispute was also
significant because the claim and ensuing settlement occurred
while the United States, Canada, and other developed countries
were in negotiations to conclude the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI), negotiations that unraveled in December
1998.97 The Ethyl dispute has been described as "pivotal" in
galvanizing non-governmental organizations' (NGOs) opposition
to the MAI.9"
92 PUB. CITIZEN & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, supra note 90, at 8. In 1995, Ethyl won
a lawsuit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which subsequently lifted
its restrictions on MMT. Id. at n.34.
93 See Ethyl Corp., 38 I.L.M. at 711, 7.
94 See id. 1 21. Although NAFTA requires investors to provide at least 90 days'
notice before filing a claim, NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1119, Ethyl provided seven
months' notice. Ethyl Corp., 38 I.L.M. at 714, T 21.
95 David R. Haigh, Chapter 11 - Private Party vs. Governments, Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 115, 133 (2000).
One likely factor behind the settlement was the fact that the Manganese-based Fuel
Additives Act had been invalidated by a Canadian arbitral tribunal, pursuant to an
agreement among Canada's provinces, the Agreement on Internal Trade. See id.
96 PUB. CITIZEN & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, supra note 90, at 10; see also Haigh,
supra note 95, at 125 (noting that, to the extent that statements of legislative intent are
actionable, Chapter 11 "creates an opportunity for foreign [investors] ... to attempt to
influence the legislative process); cf EDWARD M. GRAHAM, FIGHTING THE WRONG
ENEMY: ANTIGLOBAL ACTIVITIES AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 41-43 (Inst. for Int'l
Econ. ed., 2000) (discussing the "deep and troubling" implications of "Ethyl's NAFTA
case against Canada," particularly its regulatory takings claim).
97 See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
98 GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 37.
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The Metalclad decision attracted immediate attention as the
first and only9 9 Chapter 11 award to find a violation of NAFTA
Article 1110, the expropriation provision. The case involved a
U.S. investor who acquired a Mexican company to build and
operate a hazardous waste disposal plant and landfill station in
central Mexico. 00 Metalclad alleged that before the purchase was
consummated, Mexican federal authorities assured it that all
necessary approvals for the project had been obtained.o As
Metalclad proceeded with construction, however, the governor of
the state where the landfill was to be located publicly denounced
the project and protesters actively demonstrated against it.10 2
Eventually, municipal authorities denied Metalclad a construction
permit to build the waste station and the governor issued an
ecological decree declaring the state a protected area, effectively
preventing operation of the landfill. 103 In response to Metalclad's
claim, the arbitrators awarded it roughly $16.7 million, 04 finding
that the denial of the construction permit and the issuance of the
ecological decree expropriated Metalclad's investment.'
Professors Vicki Been and Joel Beauvais used the Metalclad
award to highlight how a Chapter 11 tribunal's interpretation of
Article 1110 potentially affords foreign investors greater
protection than that available to U.S. investors under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 0 6  They stated that "[t]he
99 As of 2004, Metalclad was the only decision to find a violation of NAFTA art.
1110. See Gantz, Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions, supra note 22, at 731 &
n.220.
100 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award, T 2 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002). The entity Metalclad acquired
had operated a hazardous waste station on the same site, which closed due to local
opposition to its operation. See PUB. CITIZEN & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, supra note 90, at
10-11.
101 See Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, TT 33-35.
102 See id. J 37, 46.
103 Id. 50, 59-60.
104 Id. 131. The amount of the award was later reduced to $15.6 million after a
Canadian court, in an action to enforce the award, partially set it aside. See United
Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp, 2001 BCSC 664, 133-135 (Can. B.C.) (B.C. Sup.
Ct.).
105 Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 104-112.
106 See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory
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Metalclad award opened the door for property owners to use
NAFTA to assert what we in the United States think of as
'regulatory takings' challenges to land use and environmental
regulations,"'07 suggesting that Metalclad would have been
decided differently under U.S. takings jurisprudence."'
Metalclad is also significant because of the expansive manner
in which the tribunal interpreted NAFTA Article 1105(1), the fair
and equitable treatment provision. The tribunal found that the
denial of a construction permit and the issuance of the ecological
decree effectively denied Metalclad a "predictable framework" for
planning its investment, thereby violating Article 1105(1).'09 It
interpreted Article 1105(1) as requiring the host state to act in a
transparent manner regarding protected investments.o Such a
broad interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment standard,
seen in Metalclad and other NAFTA awards,"' eventually
prompted the NAFTA Free Trade Commission"2 to adopt an
interpretation of Article 1105(1) that was intended to narrow its
scope, e.g., by emphasizing that "[t]he concepts of 'fair and
Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 32-34, 37 (2003). The authors assert that
NAFTA Chapter 11 decisions, including Metalclad, threaten to expand the scope of the
host state's liability for regulatory takings beyond that of U.S. takings jurisprudence, for
example, by ignoring the reasonableness of the investor's claimed investment-backed
expectations, or by ignoring the reasonableness of the investor's reliance on
governmental representations that later turn out to be false. Id. at 59-86.
107 Id. at 33.
108 Id. at 72-78 (explaining how a U.S. court likely would have applied the
doctrines of "vested rights" and "estoppel" to reject Metalclad's claim).
109 Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, % 99-101.
110 Id. TJ76.
Ill The other NAFTA awards include Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Gov't of Can., Award
on the Merits of Phase 2, % 110-11 (NAFTA Arb. Trib Apr. 10, 2001),
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeFinalMeritsAward.pdf (finding
that art. 1105(1)'s reference to "fair and equitable treatment" establishes an additional
obligation beyond the international law minimum), and S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov't of
Can., 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1438, 1 266 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Nov. 13, 2000) (partial award
under NAFTA/UNCITRAL) (finding that a breach of NAFTA's national treatment
obligation also constitutes a violation of art. 1105(1)). See also Gantz, Evolution ofFTA
Investment Provisions, supra note 22, at 709-13 (discussing cases).
112 The NAFTA "Free Trade Commission is composed of cabinet-level
representatives of the NAFTA parties," and has the power to issue binding
interpretations of NAFTA's provisions. Ldvesque, supra note 22, at 254 & n.20 (citing
NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1131(2)).
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equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' [in Article
1105(1)] do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that
which is required by the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens."ll 3 Thus, although the outcome of
Metalclad favored a U.S. investor, the tribunal's broad
interpretation of NAFTA's expropriation and fair and equitable
treatment provisions was controversial in the United States,
especially because the measures at issue appeared to be driven by
environmental protection and health concerns." 4
In contrast to Ethyl and Metalclad, Loewen Group, Inc. v.
United States"' and Methanex"'6 involved Canadian investors who
brought Chapter 11 claims against the United States. Although the
arbitral tribunals dismissed the investors' claims in both cases, the
mere existence of the claims strongly affected public opinion in
113 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes ofInterpretation ofCertain Chapter 11
Provisions, FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE CAN., 2 (July 31, 2001),
http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-
diff/NAFTA-Interpr.aspx?lang-en&view=d (discussing FTC Interpretation). The FTC
Interpretation addresses two issues affecting Chapter 11 proceedings: confidentiality and
the minimum standard of treatment under Article 1105(1). Id. %f 1-2. As to the
minimum standard of treatment, the FTC Interpretation states that:
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary intemational law minimum standard
of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to
investments of investors of another Party.
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the
NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there
has been a breach of Article 1105(1).
Id. T 2; see also Gantz, Evolution ofFTA Investment Provisions, supra note 22, at 713-14
(discussing the intent behind the FTC Interpretation regarding the minimum standard of
treatment).
To the extent that the customary international law minimum standard of treatment is
itself not clearly defined, Article 1105(1) remains ambiguous, even after the issuance of
the FTC Interpretation. See Gantz, Evolution ofFTA Investment Provisions, supra note
22, at 714-15; L6vesque, supra note 22, at 256.
114 See Been & Beauvais, supra note 106, at 35.
115 Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)98/3,
Award (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005).
116 Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (NAFTA Chap. 11 Arb. Trib.
August 3, 2005) (final award); see also supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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the United States towards BITs and investment arbitration. 17
Loewen was significant because it was the first Chapter 11 claim
filed against the United States."' According to Vandevelde, the
filing of Loewen's claim in October 1998 actually brought to a
close the "second wave" of U.S. BIT negotiations that had lasted
throughout much of the 1990s," 9 and prompted the government to
reevaluate the U.S. Model BIT text in light of the prospect of
defending future investment claims.'2 0
Loewen involved a Canadian funeral home and funeral
insurance company that had expanded its operations into the
United States.12 1 Loewen and its U.S. subsidiary (collectively,
"Loewen") were sued by a competitor company (O'Keefe) in
Mississippi state court in connection with several contracts that
had been concluded between Loewen and O'Keefe.'2 2 After a trial
before a predominantly African-American jury, in which the
African-American judge allegedly allowed O'Keefe's attorneys to
make numerous discriminatory and xenophobic comments
regarding Loewen, the jury awarded O'Keefe $500 million in
damages.'23 Rather than post the $625 million bond required to
pursue an appeal, Loewen settled O'Keefe's claim for $175
million 24 and then brought a Chapter 11 claim against the United
States, seeking approximately $725 million in damages. 12 5
Loewen asserted that the judge's conduct at trial was
discriminatory, denied it fair and equitable treatment, and (in
117 See Been & Beauvais, supra note 106, at 35-36.
118 See NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, supra note 85 (providing links to all
notices of intent to file a Chapter 11 claim against the US).
119 VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 64-65. Between
October 1998 and September 1999, the United States completed BIT negotiations with
Mozambique, El Salvador, and Bahrain, states whose companies were unlikely to invest
in the United States. Id. On the other hand, negotiations that were pending at the time
with Venezuela and South Korea were abandoned. Id
120 Id.
121 See Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No.




125 U.S. Department of State, The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v.
U.S., NAFTA INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS: CASES FILED AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3755.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
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conjunction with the Mississippi courts' alleged denial of
Loewen's right to appeal through the bonding requirement)
effectively expropriated Loewen's investment in violation of
Chapter 11.126 While the claim was pending, observers expressed
concern that Chapter 11 would, in effect, allow the Loewen
tribunal, and potentially other arbitral tribunals, to review U.S.
trial proceedings for error.'27 Loewen's claim was eventually
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds,'2 8 but the language of the
award suggests that the claim would have been dismissed in any
event because Loewen failed to exhaust its domestic appeals of the
Mississippi judgment prior to bringing its Chapter 11 claim. 2 9
Yet at the time Loewen's claim was pending, the prospect of
arbitrators subjecting the U.S. trial system to judgment by
international arbitrators was unsettling to observers in the United
States.'o
126 See Loewen, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 39.
127 See William S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and Errors Under
NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 564 (2002) (using Loewen to argue
against review by international tribunals as a means of correcting trial errors, and in
favor of amending Chapter 11 to require exhaustion of domestic appeals before
submitting a claim); NOW with Bill Moyers: Trading Democracy - a Bill Moyers Special
(PBS television broadcast Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Moyers Special] (posing the
question whether the "jurors of Mississippi . .. [will] be overruled by the NAFTA
tribunals"). A transcript of the broadcast is available at
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript tdfull.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
128 See Loewen, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 220-40. While the
arbitration was pending, Loewen reorganized in bankruptcy as a U.S. corporation,
although it spun off its rights in the NAFTA arbitration to a newly-created Canadian
subsidiary. The tribunal dismissed Loewen's claims, notwithstanding the fact that
Loewen was Canadian at the time the claim was filed. Because the ultimate party in
interest was now a U.S. citizen, the tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
the claim under NAFTA Chapter 11. Id.
129 See id. 147-217. Although Chapter 11 does not require an investor to exhaust
domestic remedies prior to filing an arbitration claim, see NAFTA, supra note 2, art.
1121 (in effect allowing investor to submit a claim without exhausting domestic
remedies), the tribunal framed the issue as whether a judicial decision can amount to a
denial of justice, and be actionable as a breach of NAFTA, where that decision was not
appealed to the court of last resort. See Loewen, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
Award, 158-64 (explaining why NAFTA art. 1121 does not constitute a waiver of the
international law doctrine that treats only decisions of the court of last resort as
international wrongs).
130 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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Methanex, the target of Greider's critique in The Nation,'"' has
been described as the "most unnerving" of all of the Chapter 11
disputes.1 32 Although Methanex's claim, like Loewen's, was
eventually dismissed, the size of the claim (close to $1 billion) and
the compelling public interest at stake in the dispute attracted the
attention of NAFTA critics at a pivotal time in the evolution of
U.S. BIT policy.'3 3 The Methanex tribunal dismissed all but one
of Methanex's claims on jurisdictional grounds in August 2002,'14
and the remaining claim was dismissed in 2005.1' The tribunal
found that California's actions banning the use or sale of MTBE
were not sufficiently connected to Methanex to fall within the
scope of NAFTA Chapter 11, which applies only to a NAFTA
party's measures "relating to" the investors of another NAFTA
party.13 6  But the filing and adjudication of the Methanex claim
attracted public attention in the United States at the same time that
Congress was enacting Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
legislation.'37 In addition to Greider's critique, the Methanex
131 See supra Part I (discussing Greider's critique of Methanex).
132 Vagts, supra note 9, at xxv.
133 See, e.g., Greider, supra note 1, at 21-22.
134 Methanex Corp. v. United States, First Partial Award, 172 (NAFTA Chap. 11
Arb. Trib. Aug. 7, 2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf
135 Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, Part IV, Chap. F, 5 (2005)
(NAFTA Chap. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 3, 2005) (final award).
136 Methanex Corp. v. United States, First Partial Award, 1147 (NAFTA Chap. 11
Arb. Trib. Aug. 7, 2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf,
discussed in SEAN D. MURPHY, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. 2:
2002-2004 168 (2006). NAFTA art. 1101(1) defines Chapter 11 as applying to measures
adopted or maintained by a NAFTA party relating to investors of another NAFTA party.
NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1101(1). The tribunal found that most of Methanex's claim
related to the indirect effect of the MTBE ban on Methanex's business interests as a
methanol producer, which lacked the "legally significant connection" required by Article
1101(1) to confer standing. Methanex Corp. v. United States, First Partial Award, 1 147
(NAFTA Chap. 11 Arb. Trib. August 7, 2002),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf. The tribunal allowed
Methanex to re-plead its allegation that California's governor enacted the MTBE ban
with the specific intent to harm foreign methanol producers. Id. % 151-52, 169.
Ultimately this allegation was also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Methanex
Corp., 44 I.L.M. at 1460-61.
137 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3810
(Supp. 2002) [hereinafter TPA]. Debate over TPA commenced with the introduction of
proposed legislation in 2001, H.R. 3005, 107th Cong. (2002), and concluded in August
2002 when TPA was signed into law. As discussed below, the passage of TPA marked a
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dispute was the centerpiece of a New York Times investigation of
Chapter 11 arbitration published in March 2001 "' and was
featured in a PBS documentary on the same topic in February
2002.139 The pending Methanex dispute caught the attention of
Congress as well. When the House of Representatives voted on a
TPA bill in December 2001, Methanex was cited by at least seven
representatives in their statements opposing the legislation.'40
Thus, the timing of Methanex played an important role in shaping
U.S. policy towards investment protection.
Substantively, Methanex's claim was also very important.
Methanex challenged measures adopted by the state of California
to protect its water supply.14 ' As such, the dispute raised issues of
crucial importance to environmentalists and other observers.
NGOs submitted petitions to the Methanex tribunal seeking leave
shift in U.S. policy regarding investment agreements. See infra notes 182-186 and
accompanying text.
138 Anthony DePalma, Nafta's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle
Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, § 3. The article is
based in part on interviews with representatives of Public Citizen, Earthjustice, and other
NAFTA critics, who described the Methanex dispute as "one of the most worrisome" of
the Chapter 11 disputes. Id at 13. The mayor of Santa Monica, California, referred to
the Methanex claim as the "height of corporate moxie." Id.
139 Moyers Special, supra note 127. The broadcast featured coverage of some of
the most contentious Chapter 11 disputes, including Methanex as well as Ethyl,
Metalclad, and Loewen. Methanex in particular was described as having the potential to
"upend democracy." Id.
A 2002 Business Week article on investor-state arbitration under NAFTA featured
the Loewen dispute, but also referenced Methanex's complaint. Paul Magnusson, The
Highest Court You've Never Heard of Do NAFTA Judges Have Too Much Authority?,
Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 2002, at 76-77, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02 _13/b3776102.htm.
140 See 147 CONG. REC. 26,316 (2001) (statement of Rep. Kennedy); 147 CONG.
REC. 25,922 (2001) (statement of Rep. Gilman); 147 CONG. REC. 24,643 (2001)
(statement of Rep. Waxman); 147 CONG. REC. 24,191 (2001) (statement of Rep. Stark);
147 CONG. REc. 24,183 (2001) (statement of Rep. DeFazio); 147 CONG. REc. 24,168
(2001) (statement of Rep. Miller); 147 CONG. REc. 23,878 (2001) (statement of Rep.
Lynch). The bill, House Bill 3005, H.R. 3005, 107th Cong. (2002), narrowly passed a
House vote, but it was a different bill, House Bill 3009, H.R. 3009, 107th Cong. (2002),
that was ultimately enacted into law. For a history of the enactment of TPA, see Hal
Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast Track:
Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More than a Name Change, 35 GEo.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 19-28 (2003).
141 See 147 CONG. REc. 24,643 (2001) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
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to file amicus briefs for the tribunal's consideration highlighting
the public interest at stake in the dispute.'42 Several environmental
NGOs'4 3 jointly submitted an application for amicus curiae status
that noted how resolution of the dispute "[could] affect
California's MTBE measures, as well as the willingness and
ability of governments worldwide to implement measures to
protect the environment or health in the future."l44 "A decision
requiring the United States to compensate Methanex could create
pressure on California to rescind the MTBE measures or affect the
cost to U.S. and California taxpayers of maintaining them."'4 5 The
International Institute for Sustainable Development, a Canada-
based international NGO whose "mandate ... is to foster ...
policies and practices in support of. . . sustainable development,"
submitted an application that characterized the Methanex claim as
"go[ing] to the heart of the limits placed by NAFTA on
governmental authority ... to ensure that economic development
and sustainable development are integrated . .. policy
objectives." 46
The pending Loewen and Methanex claims, especially in light
of the pro-investor decision in Metalclad, were instrumental in
crystallizing opposition to investment protection in the United
States as Congress was deliberating over TPA. As Greider
commented in a PBS interview that aired several months prior to
142 Notably, the Methanex tribunal was the first investment arbitration tribunal to
accept amicus submissions. HOWARD MANN, THE FINAL DECISION IN METHANEX V.
UNITED STATES: SOME NEW WINE IN SOME NEW BOTTLES 11 (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable
Dev. ed., 2001), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/commentarymethanex.pdf.
The tribunal issued its decision in principle to allow amicus submissions in January
2001, and several NGOs later submitted applications for amicus curiae status along with
amicus briefs in March 2004. Id. at 11-12. The tribunal also authorized the hearings to
be viewable to the public through a live closed-circuit television broadcast. Id at 12.
143 Participating NGOs included: Bluewater Network, Communities for a Better
Environment, and the Center for International Environmental Law. Application of Non-
Disputing Parties for Leave to File a Written Submission at 3, Methanex Corp. v. United




146 Application for Amicus Curiae Status by the International Institute for
Sustainable Development, 5, 10, Methanex Corp. v. United States (Mar. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/30473.pdf.
176 [Vol. XXXVIII
TRENDS IN INVESTMENT TREATY PRACTICE
passage of the TPA legislation,
I think the public ... will be shocked and quite confused, if any
of a number of cases, whether it's Methanex or Loewen, . . .
manage[s] to win damages against the United States. People at
first are gonna say, Huh? What is that about? And then, as it's
explained to them, they're gonna say, we didn't sign on for that.
That's not what we think about as a global trade agreement.
And then the education process is quickly gonna turn into
147
anger. . . .
The prospect of the United States being held liable for billions
of dollars to foreign investors challenging environmental and other
regulation touched a nerve in the United States, generating
substantial controversy over NAFTA Chapter 11 .1 As described
in the next section, this controversy required supporters of TPA to
make concessions, including a mandate to the executive branch to
effect important changes in U.S. policy towards investment
agreements. As discussed below, this shift in policy triggered
changes to the investment chapters of FTAs that the United States
concluded with Chile and Singapore and eventually shaped the
content of the 2004 Model BIT.
2. Effects on U.S. BIT Practice: MAI and TPA
One of the earliest casualties of the post-NAFTA backlash
against investment protection was the collapse of negotiations for
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in December
1998.149 If it had been enacted, the MAI would have contained
similar investment protection commitments to those in most BITs
and in NAFTA Chapter 11. "o The MAI was intended to bind only
OECD member countries.'"' The rationale behind limiting the
147 Moyers Special, supra note 127 (quoting William Greider).
148 See, e.g., id. 17.
149 See Been & Beauvais, supra note 106, at 35.
150 Based on the April 24, 1998 negotiating text (the last draft of the MAI produced
before negotiations collapsed), the MAI would have included investor protections
relating to non-discrimination, fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, transfers,
performance requirements and investor-state dispute settlement. GRAHAM, supra note
96, at 51, 57-63, 72-78. For an explanation of these provisions as they appear in most
BITs, see supra notes 11, 52 and accompanying text.
151 GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 9. OECD stands for the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development, an intergovernmental organization of mostly developed
countries whose mission "is to promote policies to improve the economic and social
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MAI to OECD members was that these countries were "like-
minded" in terms of investment protection and therefore would
have little difficulty concluding an agreement containing rigorous
investor protections. 5 2 It turned out, however, that the countries
negotiating the MAI were not as "like minded" as anticipated.'
Additionally, NGO activists, determined to frustrate the enactment
of what they referred to as "NAFTA on steroids," mobilized to
block its passage.'54
The grassroots effort against the MAI was "unprecedented" in
its international scope.'"' Over 500 NGOs worldwide mobilized
and expressed opposition to the MAI, including: citizens'
watchdog groups The Council of Canadians and Public Citizen's
Global Trade Watch; environmental groups such as Friends of the
Earth and Sierra Club; and groups concerned about the effects of
globalization, such as Oxfam and the Malaysia-based Third World
Network.'5 6 One diplomatic observer described the mobilization
as "the first successful [i]ntemet campaign by [NGOs]."' As
well-being of people around the world." OECD, About the OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
152 GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 9. As of 1998, the OECD's members included not
only the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and most European
countries, but also Mexico, Turkey and South Korea. See OECD, List of OECD Member
Countries - Ratification ofthe Convention on the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/generall
listofoecdmembercountries-ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm (last visited Oct.
7, 2012).
153 See GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 25-35.
154 Id at 39. Many of the protestors were perceived by MAI negotiators as less
interested in dialogue than in putting an end to the negotiations. See CHARAN
DEVEREAUx, ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL D. WATKINS, CASE STUDIES IN US
TRADE NEGOTATION: VOL. 1: MAKING THE RULES 168 (Inst. for Int'l Econ. ed., 2006)
(quoting one NGO representative who told negotiators, "[w]e killed fast track and we're
going to kill the MAI").
155 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WAKTINS, supra note 154, at 167.
156 Id. at 161-62, 168. The protestors presented a statement to the OECD
formalizing their opposition to the MAI, signed by 560 NGOs from sixty-seven different
countries. See NGO/OECD Consultation on the MAI, Joint NGO Statement on the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), http://www.web.net/coc/ngostatement.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
157 Madelaine Drohan, How the Net Killed the MAI: Grassroots Groups Used Their
Own Globalization to Derail Deal, THE GLOBE & MAIL (CANADA), Apr. 29, 1998, at Al.
Access to the internet enabled protesters such as the Council of Canadians in Canada and
the Third World Network in Malaysia to quickly inform each other of new developments
and pool information, thereby overcoming the secrecy in which the MAI negotiations
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such, the MAI protests were a rehearsal of sorts for the 1999
Seattle protests and helped to prepare NGOs to mobilize U.S.
public opinion against investment protection during Congressional
deliberations over TPA bills.15' The protestors characterized the
MAI negotiations as being shrouded in secrecy and "skewed" in
favor of corporate investors." 9 They frequently invoked the Ethyl
disputel6 0 to warn that the MAI, like NAFTA Chapter 11, could be
used by corporations to strike down legitimate regulation, such as
measures to protect the environment.16 ' It is likely that the MAI
talks would have collapsed in any event. Factors that complicated
the MAI negotiations included the U.S. passage of the Helms-
Burton Act in 1996, European insistence on an exception from the
most-favored nation obligation with respect to regional economic
integration organizations, and France and Canada's insistence on
an exception to the treaty for "cultural industries."I 62 Nonetheless,
the NGOs' intense and vocal opposition to the MAI certainly
contributed to the collapse of the negotiations.163
Perhaps the collapse of the MAI is evidence that developed
countries, faced with the prospect of hosting foreign investment
from other MAI countries, were not willing to commit to the
strong investment protections that they themselves had pressured
capital-importing countries to undertake.164  The MAI's demise
was perceived by many in Brazil, for example, as a sign that "there
were allegedly conducted. Id.
158 See GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 48.
159 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 154, at 163-64.
160 See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
161 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 154, at 164; GRAHAM, supra
note 96, at 39;
162 GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 25-35.
163 Id. at 35. Indeed, one of the negotiators suggested that involving the NGOs in
discussions "may have been what sank the MAI." DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS,
supra note 154, at 167. It was at the MAI negotiations in Paris that many of the
protestors met for the first time and exchanged business cards. Ironically, the site of the
MAI negotiations was a forum that facilitated anti-globalization protestors in
establishing their network. Id
164 See Jost GILBERTO SCANDIUCCI FILHO, THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE WITH
BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A NoTE 4-5 (U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev.
ed., 2007), available at http://archive.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/
c2em2 IpI 5en.pdf.
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was something to fear" about BITs. 16 ' This perception contributed
to the refusal by the Brazilian parliament to ratify numerous BITs
that the government had signed in the 1990s.' 66 In any event, the
collapse of the MAI negotiations illustrated the potential lobbying
power of NGOs in the age of the internet and demonstrated that
concluding an agreement on investment protection among capital-
exporting countries was more difficult than anticipated.
As for TPA, its enactment was characterized by deep
disagreements within Congress over issues of free trade and
globalization, and by the ongoing controversy over NAFTA
Chapter 11.167 TPA legislation, or what used to be known as "fast
track" legislation, bypasses procedural obstacles to the
implementation of international trade agreements. 16 If a trade
agreement is concluded under TPA, Congress will adopt
implementing legislation in an expedited manner, without
amendments or filibusters.169  In exchange, TPA enumerates
objectives to guide the executive branch in negotiating the treaty,
and Congress is given a supervisory role in the treaty negotiation
process.7 o Although Congress consistently renewed fast track
legislation throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the issue has become
more polarized in recent decades. '
Passage of TPA in 2001 and 2002 was particularly divisive. In
December 2001, a TPA bill passed the House of Representatives
by a mere one-vote margin.172 Much of the controversy over TPA
involved the politics of international trade, but a good deal of it
stemmed from concerns about investment protection and NAFTA
Chapter 11.173 Some of the same consumer rights and
165 Id. For a discussion of the history of Brazil's approach to BITs and investment
arbitration, see infra Part 111.B.2.D
166 FILHO, supra note 164, at 4-5; See also infra Part III.B.2.D.
167 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
168 See Shapiro & Brainard, supra note 140, at 10-16 (describing the "fast track"
procedure).
169 See id at 15-16.
170 See id at 11-13.
171 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 154, at 187. For example, in
1997 and 1998, the Clinton administration fought unsuccessfully to enact "fast track"
legislation. Id. at 220-28.
172 Id at 230.
173 See VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 70 (noting that
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environmental NGOs that protested against the MAI also lobbied
against TPA.17 4 In September 2001, as the House began work on a
TPA bill, Public Citizen and environmental NGO Friends of the
Earth issued a roughly fifty-page report, arguing that NAFTA
Chapter 11 issues had become "central" to the debate over TPA,
and invoking several of the most controversial Chapter 11 disputes
as evidence for why Congress should oppose TPA."' In their
statements discussing the TPA bill, members of Congress
repeatedly expressed concern over NAFTA's investment
protection provisions, citing examples of controversial Chapter 11
disputes such as Methanex.17 6 In 2002, as the House and Senate
worked on a conference version of the TPA bill, a group of thirty-
five state attorneys general and the U.S. Conference of Mayors
"[i]nvestment policy became a visible and controversial issue during the enactment of
the TPA.").
174 See Business, Environmentalists Clash over TPA Investor Protections, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Oct. 19, 2001, T 7 (describing how environmentalists opposed a TPA bill
because it failed to scale back investor protections from those in NAFTA Chapter 11).
175 See PUB. CITIZEN & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, supra note 90, at iii. The report
warned of the consequences of enabling the expansion of NAFTA-like investor
protections to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas:
As a new Fast Track fight looms in Congress in the fall of 2001, the sovereignty
and public policy implications of the NAFTA cases reviewed in this report
argue against the use of Fast Track for the development of the proposed FTAA
and more generally as a tool of democratic decision-making and public policy.
Id
176 See 147 CONG. REC. 26,316 (2001) (statement of Rep. Kennedy); 147 CONG.
REC. 25,922 (2001) (statement of Rep. Gilman); 147 CONG. REC. 24,643 (2001)
(statement of Rep. Waxman); 147 CONG. REC. 24,191 (2001) (statement of Rep. Stark);
147 CONG. REC. 24,183 (2001) (statement of Rep. DeFazio); 147 CONG. REC. 24,168
(2001) (statement of Rep. Miller); 147 CONG. REC. 23,878 (2001) (statement of Rep.
Lynch); see also 148 CONG. REC. 8,291-92 (2002) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (observing
concern of many in US regarding "the effect of NAFTA's investment settlement dispute
process . . . on the ability of . .. States to promulgate legitimate health and safety laws");
148 CONG. REC. 6,711-12 (2002) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (discussing the secrecy of
Chapter 11 tribunals and the "chilling effect" of claims like Methanex's on
environmental regulation); 148 CONG. REc. 6,703 (2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus)
[hereinafter Baucus Statement] (discussing the need to balance investment protections
against "the legitimate needs of regulatory agencies, and the concerns of environmental
and public interest groups"); 148 CONG. REC. 6,433 (statement of Sen. Hollings) (reading
into the record a Business Week article describing the "secretive process" of NAFTA
panels); 148 CONG. REC. 5,994-95 (2002) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (criticizing the
TPA bill for failure to limit expropriation guarantees); supra note 140 and accompanying
text.
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wrote to members of Congress, urging them to limit investment
protections in the TPA bill.'n In May 2002, Senator John Kerry
proposed an amendment to TPA that would have dramatically
limited the investment protection commitments of any trade
agreement concluded under TPA."' Although the Kerry
amendment was ultimately defeated, it enjoyed substantial support
both in and out of Congress.'
In light of the uncertain prospect of TPA's passage and in
response to the concerns expressed regarding NAFTA Chapter 11,
supporters of TPA made concessions to ensure passage of the bill.
The most significant compromise provisions expanded trade
adjustment assistance to U.S. workers whose jobs are displaced
177 Local Officials Urge Trade Conferees to Limit Investor Protections, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, July 26, 2002, y 1-7, 9-11. In July, state attorneys general wrote to House
Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Thomas and Senate Finance Committee
Chairman Max Baucus, urging that the investment section of the TPA bill: (i) stipulate
that foreign investors have no greater rights to compensation than U.S. citizens; (ii) deny
arbitrators the right to award foreign investors compensation that goes beyond U.S.
standards; and (iii) deny arbitrators jurisdiction to award foreign investors compensation
based on the rulings of U.S. courts. Id. at 2, 5-6. In June 2002, the U.S. Conference of
Mayors issued a similar resolution. US Conference of Mayors, Proposed Resolutions:
70th Annual Conference of Mayors, 163-65, http://www.usmayors.org/
70thAnnualMeeting/2002resolutions.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
178 148 CONG. REC. 8,092 (2002) (text of Senate Amendment 3430). The proposed
amendment required that the investment protection provisions of any trade agreement: (i)
limit the expropriation guarantee by excluding compensation for "measures that cause a
mere diminution" in property value; (ii) exempt from the expropriation and fair and
equitable treatment guarantees legitimate regulation to protect health, safety and welfare,
the environment or public morals; and (iii) require a foreign investor to submit an
investment claim to a "competent authority" in the home country prior to bringing the
claim to investment arbitration. Id. 2102(b)(3)(D), (G), and (H).
179 Of the ninety-six senators that voted on the Kerry amendment, forty-one voted
in favor (the amendment was defeated by a 55-41 vote). Senate Defeats Kerry
Investment Amendment to Trade Bill, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 21, 2002, TT 1-2.
Numerous groups outside the Senate submitted letters expressing support for the Kerry
amendment. See Consumers Union Backs Kerry Amendment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May
22, 2002, TT 1-4; Environment, Local Government Groups Back Kerry Investment
Amendment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 15, 2002, % 1-7; Letter to Max Baucus, U.S.
Senator, from Mike McGrath, Att'y Gen., State of Montana (May 14, 2002), in Montana
Attorney General Backs Kerry Investment Amendment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 16,
2002, 1-5; Oklahoma Legislature Resolution Backs Kerry Investment Amendment,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 15, 2002, $T 1-9; Letter to Charles Rangel, U.S. Congressman,
from Jay Insley, Earl Blumenauer, & Brian Baird, Members of U.S. Congress (May 16,
2002), in Pro-Trade House Democrats Back Kerry Amendment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May
20, 2002, $T 1-4.
182
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due to foreign trade. 8 0  However, TPA supporters compromised
on investment protection as well. Senate Finance Committee
Chairman Max Baucus, who led TPA negotiations in the Senate,
repeatedly emphasized that the result of the TPA process should
be investment agreements that achieve a balance between
protecting U.S. investors abroad and defending the regulatory
authority of the United States.' TPA was signed into law in
August 2002.182 It defined the U.S. principal negotiating
objectives with respect to foreign investment as (i) ensuring that
foreign investors in the United States "are not accorded greater
substantive rights with respect to investment protections" than
those available to U.S. investors, and (ii) securing for investors
protections that are "comparable" to those available under U.S.
law."' Framing the principal negotiating objectives as limiting
protection to foreign investors has been described as an
unprecedented and "major" shift in U.S. investment treaty
policy.184 TPA also enumerated specific negotiation objectives
that similarly limit investment protection, including: (i)
establishing standards for expropriation and fair and equitable
treatment "consistent with United States legal principles and
practice";8 s (ii) improving investor-state arbitration procedures by
180 See DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 154, at 230-31; see also
Shapiro & Brainard, supra note 140, at 26.
181 In a speech to the International Institute of Economics, Senator Baucus
described how the House TPA bill passed by single vote, emphasizing the need to craft a
broader bipartisan consensus on TPA. In commenting on the Senate version of the bill,
he referred to the controversy over NAFTA Chapter 11 and noted how the Senate bill
attempted to address some of the concerns raised about investment protection. See
Baucus Suggests Potential for Changing TPA-TAA Bill Limited, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb.
26, 2002, if 3-7; see also Baucus Says TPA Allows Government Screen for Investment
Suits, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 26, 2002, 1 [hereinafter Baucus Says TPA] (stating to
then-U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick that the result of TPA "should be
investment agreements that balance our interest in protecting US investors abroad with
our interest in defending the regulatory authority of government at all levels in the
United States"); Baucus Statement, supra note 176; see also infra note 185 and
accompanying text.
182 See MURPHY, supra note 136, at 157.
183 TPA § 3802(b)(3).
184 VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 73-74; see also
Gantz, Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions, supra note 22, at 73-75 (describing the
TPA language as a compromise that "failed to fully satisfy anyone").
185 TPA § 3802(b)(3)(D)-(E).
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enabling public input, deterring frivolous claims, and providing a
mechanism to appeal arbitral decisions;'"' and (iii) enhancing
transparency in investor-state arbitration by publishing all
proceedings, submissions and decisions, making hearings of the
arbitral tribunal open to the public, and establishing a mechanism
for amicus submissions.'8 7
To summarize, although the Kerry amendment did not pass,
TPA's negotiation objectives reflect the concerns about NAFTA
Chapter 11 raised by Senator Kerry and others during
Congressional deliberation over TPA. As the Senate Finance
Committee's report on the TPA bill acknowledged, the negotiation
objectives are shaped by the fact that the United States may find
itself on either side of an investor-state arbitration dispute:
The negotiating objective on foreign investment reflects the
Committee's view that it is a priority for negotiators to seek
agreements protecting the rights of U.S. investors abroad .... It
also reflects the view that in entering into investment
agreements, negotiators must seek to protect the interests of the
United States as a potential defendant in investor-state dispute
settlement. In other words, there ought to be a balance.
Protecting the rights of U.S. investors abroad should not come at
the expense of making Federal, State and local laws and
regulations unduly vulnerable to challenge by foreign
investors. 8 8
In other words, TPA seeks a more balanced approach to
investment protection because the United States increasingly
operates under a "veil of ignorance" as to its vested interests
relating to investment protection.
The TPA's negotiation objectives regarding investment guided
the United States in negotiating the investment chapters of the
U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA)189 and the U.S.-
Singapore FTA.'90 Negotiations for these FTAs had been ongoing
186 Id. § 3802(b)(3)(G).
187 Id. § 3802(b)(3)(H).
188 S. REP. No. 107-139, at 13 (2002) (emphasis added).
189 United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text
[hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA].
190 United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text
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since 2000,'9' and the investment chapters for both agreements
were concluded only a few months after TPA's enactment in
August 2002.192 In fact, then-U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick had been considering options for implementing the TPA's
investment objectives as early as March 2002.1'9
The 2004 Model BIT,19 4 in turn, is modeled off of the U.S.-
Chile and U.S.-Singapore FTAs, as well as NAFTA.19 5 Although
BITs, which do not address trade issues, technically are not
governed by TPA,1 96 there were practical reasons why the State
Department and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR)' 97 made the 2004 Model BIT provisions consistent with
the investment chapters of the recently-concluded FTAs. These
reasons included the desirability of establishing a coherent and
uniform treaty practicel9 8 and the existence of most-favored nation
[hereinafter U.S.-Singapore FTA]; see also VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 12, at 71 (noting that TPA's negotiating objectives "provided the guidance
from Congress that allowed U.S. negotiators to complete the preparation of' the U.S.-
Chile FTA and U.S.-Singapore FTA investment chapters); Gantz, Evolution of FTA
Investment Provisions, supra note 22, at 707 (observing that the investment chapter of
the U.S.-Chile FTA "obviously was designed in significant part to comply with the TPA
objectives").
191 See MURPHY, supra note 136, at 158, 161.
192 A proposed investment chapter to the U.S.-Chile FTA was drafted by early
October 2002, and most of the investment chapter to the U.S.-Singapore FTA was
complete by November 2002. See VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note
12, at 71.
193 See Baucus Says TPA, supra note 181, 2 (referring to the fact that Zoellick
already had been considering options for putting the investment protection provisions of
TPA into effect).
194 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 117601 .pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2012)
[hereinafter 2004 Model BIT].
195 See Gantz, supra note 22, at 729 n.214.
196 See TPA, § 3802(b)(3).
197 Whereas USTR is principally responsible for negotiating FTAs, USTR and the
State Department share responsibility for negotiating BITs. See Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Related Agreements, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm [hereinafter BITs and Related Agreements]
(last visited Oct. 7, 2012); see also VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note
12, at 92 (noting that primary responsibility for the BIT program shifted from the State
Department to USTR in 1980, but over time the two agencies developed a practice of
sharing responsibility for negotiating BITs).
198 See VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 97.
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clauses in BITs and FTAs, which raised the prospect of foreign
investors under one treaty invoking the protections of another.' 9
In fact, in developing the investment chapters to the U.S.-Chile
and U.S.-Singapore FTAs, USTR worked with the State
Department and members of Congress with the expectation that
the FTA provisions would also serve as a model for future BITs.2 00
Hence, in 2003 and 2004, USTR and the State Department revised
the Model BIT in order to conform to the recently-concluded
FTAs and issued a draft of the 2004 Model BIT in February
2004.201
Table 1 below provides a chronology of the events discussed
in the previous section, culminating in the issuance of the 2004
U.S. Model BIT. The chronology illustrates how, by shaping
public opinion during the passage of TPA, the backlash against
Chapter 11 ultimately affected U.S. practice regarding FTAs and
BITs. Part II.C describes some of the resulting changes in U.S.
BIT practice, as reflected in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT.
199 See id. at 72.
200 See id. at 71.
201 MURPHY, supra note 136, at 163; see also Mark Kantor, The New Draft Model
US. BIT: Noteworthy Developments, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 383, 385 (2004) (describing the
objective of the 2004 Model BIT as providing a consistent U.S. approach to negotiating
FTAs and BITs).
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Table 1: Chronology of Events Affecting Evolution of U.S.
Model BIT 20 2
Date Event
January 1994 NAFTA enters into force.
January 1997 Investor files claim in Metalclad v. Mexico.
April 1997 Investor files claim in Ethyl v. Canada.
July 1998 Ethyl claim settles ($13 million paid).
October 1998 Investor files claim in Loewen v. United
States.
December 1998 MAI negotiations are terminated.
December 1999 Investor files claim in Methanex v. United
States.
August 2000 Metalclad award issued ($15.6 million
paid). 203
Nov.-Dec. 2000 United States begins FTA negotiations with
Chile and Singapore.
December 2001 TPA bill narrowly passes House.
August 2002 TPA bill signed into law.
August 2002 Methanex partial award issued (dismissing
most of investor's claims).
Dec. 2002- Negotiations completed on U.S.-Chile and
Jan. 2003 U.S.-Singapore FTAs.
June 2003 Loewen award issued (claim dismissed).
January 2004 Chile and Singapore FTAs enter into force.
February 2004 USTR and State Department issue draft 2004
Model BIT.
202 See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2203; Ethyl Corp. v. Gov't of Canada, 38 1.L.M.
708 (NAFTA Chap. 11 Trib. June 24, 1998) (award on jurisdiction under
NAFTA/UNCITRAL); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002); Loewen Grp., Inc. v.
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep
442 (2005); Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005) (NAFTA Chap. 11
Arb. Trib. Aug. 3, 2005) (final award); VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra
note 12, at 96-98; MURPHY, supra note 136, at 157-63; Haigh, supra note 95 at 121, 133;
GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 12; Ldvesque, supra note 22, at 255; Shapiro & Brainard,
supra note 140, at 27.
203 Although the arbitral tribunal awarded Metalclad $16.7 million, that amount
was later reduced to $15.6 million. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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C. New Generation of U.S. BITs and FTAs
Including the recently-enacted FTAs with Korea, Panama, and
Colombia, the United States has concluded FTAs containing
investment chapters with fifteen countries since the enactment of
TPA,204 and has concluded two BITs (with Uruguay and Rwanda)
since the 2004 Model BIT was issued.2 05  These BITs and FTA
investment chapters represent a new generation of U.S. investment
agreements. Vandevelde described the 2004 Model BIT as a
product of the "most extensive revision of the model negotiating
text in the history of the BIT program." 20 6  It is ironic that this
profound reform of the U.S. Model BIT occurred during the
administration of President George W. Bush. In 2009 the Obama
administration established an interagency panel to review and
revise the 2004 Model BIT text.20 7 But after over two years of
204 The United States concluded FTAs containing investment chapters with
Australia, Morocco, Chile, Singapore, and the CAFTA-DR countries (Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) in 2004; with
Panama, Oman, and Peru in 2006; and with Korea and Colombia in 2007. Free Trade
Agreements, Office of the United States Trade Representative [hereinafter USTR, Free
Trade Agreements], http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last
visited Oct. 7, 2012).
The United States-Australia FTA, unlike the other FTAs, does not provide for
investor-state arbitration of disputes. United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Austl., art. 11.16, May 18, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset upload file
248 5155.pdf (providing only for consultations between the parties on developing
procedures for investor-state dispute settlement). It has been suggested that the reason
for omitting an investor-state arbitration mechanism from the FTA was to avoid the
experience of the United States and Canada under NAFTA. See William S. Dodge,
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3 (2006);
see also Gagn6 & Morin, supra note 22, at 372-373 (suggesting that the absence of
investor-state dispute settlement procedures is acceptable to the United States only for
investment agreements with countries possessing a legal system comparable to that of
the United States, but also noting that Australia is a significant capital exporter to the
United States).
205 See BITs and Related Agreements, supra note 197. The United States-Uruguay
BIT was concluded in 2005 and entered into force in 2006; the United States-Rwanda
BIT was concluded in 2008 and entered into force in 2012. Id
206 VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 105.
207 See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United
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review and stalemate,20 8 in March 2012 the State Department and
USTR released a 2012 Model BIT2 0 9 that in key respects is
identical to the 2004 Model BIT. With minor exceptions, the
provisions of the 2004 BIT that are described below were left
virtually unchanged in the 2012 Model BIT.210
This section contrasts certain aspects of the 2004 Model BIT
with the U.S.-Argentina BIT discussed above to illustrate how the
congressional mandate expressed in TPA and the prospect of the
United States finding itself on either side of investor-state disputes
have moderated some of the most strongly pro-investor aspects of
208 In September 2009, a subcommittee of the State Department's Advisory
Committee on International Economic Policy (ACIEP) issued a report on recommended
changes to the model BIT, but the report revealed deep disagreement within the
committee as to whether and how the model BIT should be changed. See Report of the
Subcommittee on Investment of the A CIEP Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (2009), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2009/131118.htm
[hereinafter ACIEP] (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). Although the administration had
planned to conclude the review by the end of 2009, apparently disagreements over
environmental, labor and other issues stalled the process. See Amy Tsui, U.S. Business
Groups Write Clinton, Kirk Supporting Indian BIT Talks in August, 28 BNA INT'L
TRADE RPTR 1246 (2011) (citing environmental, labor, transparency and public
participation provisions as "likely sticking points" in the review process); see also China
Update, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 11, 2010, 1 8 (citing discord within the administration
and among members of Congress over labor and environmental issues as the cause of
delay).
The impasse over the model BIT text held up BIT negotiations with India and
China, and most likely the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations as well. See Business
Sends Obama Mixed Messages on Disciplining SOEs in BITs, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan.
29, 2010, % 1-9; Tsui, supra, at 1246; David Gantz, Trans-Pacific Partnership
Negotiations: Waiting for U.S. Proposals, KLUWERARBITRATIONBLOG.COM (June 20,
2011) [hereinafter Gantz, Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations],
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/06/20/trans-pacific-partnership-negotiations-
waiting-for-u-s-proposals/.
209 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [hereinafter 2012 Model BIT].
210 The 2012 Model BIT deletes Annex D, which set aspirational goals for
establishing an appellate review mechanism for investor-state arbitration, as discussed
infra note 234. Additionally, the 2012 Model BIT makes some changes to the treaty
exception for certain financial services measures. See Paolo Di Rosa, The New 2012
U.S. Model BIT: Staying the Course, KLUWERARBITRATIONBLOG.COM (June 1, 2012),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/06/01/the-new-2012-u-s-model-bit-staying-
the-course/; see also Luke Eric Peterson, United States Unveils 'New' Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty that Retains Protective Core, and Makes a Few Tweaks on Periphery,
INV. ARB. REP. (2012) http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20120422_2 (last visited Oct.
7, 2012) (subscription required).
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past treaties.2 1'
1. Preamble
Arbitral tribunals, following the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, interpret BITs in light of the treaty's object and
212purpose.22 Tribunals have relied in particular on a BIT's
preamble in determining the object and purpose of a given
treaty.213 Traditionally, preambles have stated that the purpose of
a BIT is to protect and promote investments, which has led
tribunals to interpret BIT provisions in a pro-investor manner.214
The preamble of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, for example, refers to
the parties' desire to reciprocally encourage and protect
investment in order to promote economic cooperation, stimulate
capital flows, and maintain a stable investment framework.2 15
In contrast, the preamble to the 2004 Model BIT, while
retaining the references to economic cooperation, capital flows
and stable investment framework, also adds two objectives:
providing an effective means of asserting investor claims "under
national law as well as through" arbitration; and, significantly,
achieving the other objectives of the treaty "in a manner consistent
with the protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the
promotion of internationally recognized labor rights."2 16 In other
211 This is not an exhaustive list of the changes made to the 2004 model. For a
more comprehensive comparison of the 2004 model with earlier models, see Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 US. Model BITs, in Y.B. ON INT'L
INv. L. & POL'Y: 2008-2009 283-315 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009); see also Alvarez,
supra note 19, at 9-13; Kantor, supra note 201.
212 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
213 See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLuis PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 113-14 & n.174 (2009) (citing
decisions). The preamble has been particularly influential to tribunals interpreting the
fair and equitable treatment provision in BITs. Id.
214 See id. at 114-15.
215 See U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 38, pmbl. The preamble also recognizes that
promoting economic cooperation can in turn "promote respect for internationally
recognized worker rights." Id. For an example of an arbitral award interpreting the
preamble of the U.S.-Argentina BIT in a pro-investor manner, see Siemens A.G. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARD/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiciton, 81 (Aug. 3,
2004), 12 ICSID Rep. 174 (2007), quoted in NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 213, at
114.
216 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, pmbl.
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words, unlike earlier models, the 2004 model expressly weighs
investor protection objectives against the host state's interest in
promoting the public interest. Alvarez suggests that the object and
purpose of the 2004 Model BIT reflects a "new-found awareness"
that promoting private ownership and free markets "does not
produce the desired beneficial outcomes" anticipated by the
preambles of earlier BITs.2 17
2. Limits on Indirect Expropriation
As stated,2 18 the expropriation guarantee in the U.S.-Argentina
BIT includes outright and indirect takings as well as regulatory
measures that are "tantamount" to an expropriation. 21 9 The 2004
Model BIT replaces the word "tantamount" with "equivalent." 2 20
Consistent with TPA's mandate to secure investor protections that
are "comparable" to those available under U.S. law, the 2004
model also requires the expropriation provision to be interpreted in
accordance with annexed language that defines indirect
expropriation by reference to factors derived from U.S. takings
jurisprudence.22 ' Most importantly, the 2004 model clarifies that
"[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety,
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations."2 2 2
As others have noted,223 this language will make it significantly
more difficult for investors such as Metalclad to convince an
arbitral tribunal that a regulatory measure, particularly an
environmental protection, health or safety measure, is
expropriatory.224
217 Alvarez, supra note 19, at 13.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
219 U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 37, art. VI(1)
220 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, art. 6(1).
221 See id. Annex B, 4(a); see also Lvesque, supra note 22, at 286 (noting that
the factors to weigh in determining whether a measure constitutes an indirect
expropriation are derived from the U.S. Supreme Court's Penn Central decision).
222 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, Annex B, 4(b).
223 See, e.g., Gantz, Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions, supra note 22, at 745.
224 For a detailed analysis of the expropriation provision, see id at 743-46
(discussing analogous language in the U.S.-Chile FTA). See also Ldvesque, supra note
22, at 285-87.
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3. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Consistent with the interpretation issued by the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission,225 the fair and equitable treatment obligation
has been rewritten in the 2004 Model BIT to clarify that
customary international law sets a ceiling and not a floor on the
standard of treatment that must be accorded. 2 26 An annex defines
customary international law for this purpose as general and
consistent state practice performed out of a sense of legal
obligation. 2 27  The provision now states that a host state must
accord investments treatment consistent with "customary
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security." 2 28  For further clarification, it expressly
states that these concepts do not require treatment beyond the
customary international law standard, and do not create additional
substantive rights.2 29  Alvarez has characterized the 2004 model's
revision of the fair and equitable treatment standard as
"dramatically limit[ing] its scope." 23 0 Because the standard is still
defined by reference to customary international law, however,
other commentators suggest that tribunals may continue to
interpret the standard broadly.23'
In addition to redefining the standard for indirect expropriation, the 2004 Model BIT
also incorporates special carve-outs to the expropriation guarantee for certain tax
measures and compulsory licensing measures that are otherwise WTO-compliant. See
Alvarez, supra note 19, at 10 (discussing 2004 Model BIT Srticles 6(5) and 21(2)).
225 See supra text accompanying note 113.
226 See 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, art. 5(l)-(2). Also consistent with the
NAFTA Law Commission interpretation is a statement that the finding of a breach of
another part of the BIT, or of another treaty, does not in itself establish a breach of the
fair and equitable treatment obligation. Id. art. 5(3).
227 Id. Annex A. According to Vandevelde, Annex A was written with the Loewen
dispute in mind, where the claimant argued that the network of existing BITs are part of
customary international law. Annex A was an attempt to refute this argument, at least
where treaty practice is not accompanied by independent evidence of opinio juris.
VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 268. But see Lvesque,
supra note 22, at 257-58 (noting that Annex A goes on to inject ambiguity into the
definition, by stating that the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment refers to "all customary international law principles" that protect the legal
rights and interests of aliens).
228 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, art. 5(l) (emphasis added).
229 See id. art. 5(2).
230 Alvarez, supra note 19, at 9.
231 See Gantz, Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions, supra note 22, at 727; see
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4. Investor-State Arbitration
The 2004 Model BIT introduces numerous changes to the
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. Whereas some of
these changes were mandated by TPA, others were modeled after
NAFTA Chapter 11.232 As discussed above, TPA negotiation
objectives included improving the investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism by making it more transparent, enabling public input,
deterring frivolous investor claims, establishing a mechanism for
accepting amicus submissions, and providing for appellate review
of arbitral awards.233 With the exception of establishing an
appellate review mechanism, 23 4 the 2004 Model BIT achieves
these objectives.23 The transparency provisions are particularly
significant. Article 29(1) mandates publication not only of all
decisions of the tribunal but also of all notices, pleadings, briefs,
amicus briefs, and other submissions; Article 29(2) requires the
tribunal to conduct hearings open to the public. 23 6  These
requirements are subject to essential security exceptions and to
special procedures that can be invoked at a disputing party's
request to protect confidential information. 237  These provisions
significantly enhance the public's ability to follow pending
investment disputes, and to study the growing body of investment
also Lvesque, supra note 22, at 261-62.
232 See Gagn6 & Morin, supra note 22, at 371.
233 See supra text accompanying notes 185-187.
234 Annex D only requires the treaty parties, within three years after the BIT enters
into force, to "consider" whether to establish a mechanism to review investor-state
arbitration awards. David Gantz suggests that although potentially beneficial, the legal
and practical difficulties associated with establishing an appellate body are sufficiently
daunting that the Annex may only be aspirational. David A. Gantz, An Appellate
Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and
Challenges, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39 (2006).
235 See 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, arts. 29(1) (requiring the respondent to
make available to the public documents, including the notice of intent, pleadings, briefs
and any decisions of the tribunal), 29(2) (requiring the tribunal to conduct open
hearings), 28(2) (allowing the non-disputing state to make submissions to the arbitral
tribunal), 28(4)-(6) (providing an expedited procedure for the tribunal to decide
jurisdictional or other preliminary objections of respondent, and allowing the award of
costs and attorneys' fees as a sanction for frivolous claims or defenses), 28(3) (granting
the tribunal authority to accept and consider amicus submissions).
236 Id. arts. 29(l)-(2).
237 Id. arts. 29(3)-(4).
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arbitration awards.238 The transparency requirements have
significantly altered expectations of privacy in the investment
arbitration context.23 9
Other innovations to the dispute settlement procedure of the
2004 model were influenced by NAFTA Chapter 11. Similar to
NAFTA, the 2004 model imposes a three-year limitation period
for the submission of claims 240 and requires a claimant to provide
ninety days' advance notice of intent to submit a claim to
arbitration. 24 1 The 2004 model also grants the contracting states
authority to issue joint interpretations of the treaty that are binding
on the tribunal.24 2 These provisions, although not all mandated by
TPA, serve to protect the host state's interests by limiting the
investor's power to bring claims and enhancing the state's
participation in the dispute settlement process.24 3
5. Exceptions Clause
An exceptions clause, also known as a "non-precluded
measures" (NPM) clause, is a clause in a BIT specifying certain
matters to which the BIT does not apply.244 The 2004 Model
BIT's revision of the NPM clause was not mandated by TPA but
most likely was influenced by Argentina's experience as
respondent to investor claims in the aftermath of its financial
238 See, e.g., OECD Investment Committee, Transparency and Third Party
Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: A CHANGING LANDSCAPE: A COMPANION VOLUME TO INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES (2005) (discussing how investor-state arbitration traditionally
has operated confidentially and without public participation, but arguing in favor of
greater transparency and public access, subject to certain qualifications and safeguards);
cf Levesque, supra note 22, at 267-69 (suggesting that EMEs such as India or China
may not embrace transparency or public participation in investor-state arbitration to the
same degree that the United States and Canada have).
239 See OECD Investment Committee, supra note 238.
240 See 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, art. 26(1); NAFTA, supra note 2, art.
1116(2).
241 See 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, art. 24(2); NAFTA, supra note 2, art.
1119.
242 See 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, art. 30(3); NAFTA, supra note 2, art.
1131(2).
243 See OECD Investment Committee, supra note 238.
244 NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 213, at 482-83.
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crisis. 24 5 The U.S.-Argentina BIT, similar to early U.S. model
BITs, includes a narrowly-worded NPM clause. Specifically, it
provides that the treaty "shall not preclude the application by
either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public
order ... or the protection of its own essential security
interests."24 6 Although Argentina has invoked this clause to
excuse responsibility to foreign investors for the measures it took
to stabilize its economy during the 2001-2002 financial crisis,
some tribunals have refused to apply it to excuse Argentina's
247treaty obligations. Professor Joseph Weiler commented on the
narrow scope of traditional exceptions clauses in BITs. 248  He
contrasted them with the broader scope of the General Agreement
245 See Alvarez, supra note 19, at 8 (noting the impact of Argentina's experience on
the 2004 Model BIT).
246 U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 38, art. XI. The clause also includes measures
necessary to fulfill a party's obligations to maintain international peace or security. Id.
247 For example, in CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, the tribunal
found that Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT (i) was not self-judging; and (ii)
although, in principle a major economic crisis could be found to implicate Argentina's
"essential security" interests, Argentina's crisis, although severe, did not precipitate a
"total economic and social collapse" and therefore did not provide a basis for excuse.
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award,
373, 355, 359 (May 12, 2005), 14 ICSID Rep. 158 (2009). Although an annulment panel
later found that the CMS tribunal had committed a "manifest error of law" by conflating
interpretation of Article XI with application of the international law doctrine of
necessity, it found that the error was not grounds for annulling the award. CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on
Annulment, 130, 136 (Sept. 25, 2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 251 (2009). More recently,
ICSID annulment panels annulled investment arbitration awards against Argentina for an
error similar to that found by the CMS annulment panel on grounds that the panel below
had manifestly exceeded its powers. See Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on Annulment, 223 (Jun. 29, 2010); Enron
Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision
on Annulment (Jul. 30, 2010).
For a discussion of CMS and other decisions interpreting Article XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT in the context of Argentina's financial crisis, see WILLIAM W. BURICE-
WHITE & ANDREAS VON STADEN, State Liability for Investor Harms in Exceptional
Circumstances, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: THE
CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 151-55 (Mary H. Mourra ed. 2008) (describing how, of
the four arbitral awards decided by 2007, three of the tribunals construed Article XI as
not excusing Argentina's actions in response to the crisis).
248 Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Robert Hudec Lecture, Second Biennial Global
Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (July 5, 2010) (notes on file
with author).
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on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT) public policy exceptions,
explaining the discrepancy by observing that in the BIT context,
negotiators from more powerful, developed countries (who tended
to dictate the terms of the treaties) did not imagine that their states
would ever be respondents in investor-state disputes;250 in contrast,
the GATT negotiators likely envisaged their respective states
defending before GATT panels and so included a list of public
policy exceptions to the treaty.251
In contrast to previous BITs,252 the 2004 model not only
includes specific exceptions for certain financial services and
taxation measures, 2 53 but also adds language to clarify that the
"essential security" exception is self-judging. Article 18(2) now
provides that the BIT does not preclude a state from applying
measures that it considers necessary to fulfill its obligations
relating to protection of its essential security interests.2 54 The
addition of the phrase "it considers necessary" makes explicit that
249 Subject to the requirements of its chapeau, GATT art. XX provides a list of
general exceptions to the treaty, including: exceptions for certain measures necessary to
protect public morals; to protect human, animal or plant life or health; to secure
compliance with local laws; and certain measures to conserve natural resources. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. XX(a), (b), (d), (g), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
250 Weiler, supra note 248.
251 Id.
252 The inclusion of explicit self-judging language was not unprecedented,
however. The U.S.-Russia BIT, concluded in 1992 but not yet in force, included self-
judging language in its "essential security" exception. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL,
supra note 213, at 490. NAFTA also has a national security exception (modeled after
GATT art. XXI) that contains self-judging language; see also Alvarez, supra note 19, at
10 n.28, citing NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2102(10)(b). The scope of the exception,
however, is limited to measures relating to the traffic in arms and other implements of
war, measures taken in war or other international emergency, and measures relating to
the non-proliferation of nuclear devices. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2102(l)(b).
253 Article 20 provides an exception for financial services measures adopted for
prudential reasons, or to ensure the integrity or stability of the financial system. 2004
Model BIT, supra note 194, art. 20(1). It also provides for special dispute settlement
procedures when a state invokes the article as a defense to an investor claim. Id. art.
20(3). Article 21 exempts taxation measures from all BIT obligations except (i) certain
performance requirements and (ii) the expropriation guarantee. Id. art. 21. However,
any investor bringing an expropriation claim must first submit the matter to competent
tax authorities in both countries for a determination of whether the measure constitutes
an expropriation. Id.
254 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, art. 18(2) (emphasis added).
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the applicability of the exception is to be judged by the state
invoking the exception and not by the tribunal. Although a state
invoking such an exception may be subject to objective limitations
such as good faith,255 the U.S.-Peru TPA (one of the new
generation FTAs containing an investment chapter) appears to
make the applicability of the "essential security" exception
completely non-justiciable.2 56 Alvarez has suggested that this new
version of the essential security exception, if construed broadly as
suggested by the U.S.-Peru TPA, may render a host state's treaty
obligations illusory, acting as a "get-out-of-jail-free card" for any
host state that seeks to invoke it.2 5 7
The new generation of U.S. BITs and FTAs, therefore,
represents a fundamental shift in the U.S. approach towards treaty-
based investment protection, both in its limitations on the
substantive obligations of the host state to foreign investors and its
introduction of greater transparency and public participation to the
investor-state dispute settlement process. This shift in approach
can also be seen in the length and detail of the 2004 model relative
to previous model BITs. Under the 2004 model, the host state's
obligations under the treaty are substantially more qualified, which
is a consequence of the increasingly likely prospect that the United
States may find itself on the host state side of an investor-state
dispute.
D. Claims Under New Generation FTAs: CAFTA-DR and
U.S.-Peru TPA
As of yet only one arbitral tribunal, in Railroad Development
Corp. v. Republic of Guatemala,2 5 8 has interpreted the substantive
255 See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 213, at 494 (noting that even where a
security exception to a BIT is self-judging, tribunals still generally hold a state to a
standard of good faith).
256 See U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, art. 22.2 n.2, Apr. 12,
2006,
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset-uploadfile841
9542.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Peru TPA], discussed in Alvarez, supra note 19, at 10 n.28
(providing "for greater certainty" that if the essential security exception is invoked in an
investor-state dispute settlement proceeding, the tribunal shall find that the exception
applies).
257 Alvarez, supra note 19, at 15.
258 ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award (June 29, 2012).
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obligations of the new generation of U.S. investment
agreements. 25 9 But several jurisdictional and other preliminary
decisions have been issued with respect to claims filed against host
states under CAFTA-DR.2 60 Additionally, a request for arbitration
was recently filed under the U.S.-Peru TPA.2 6' Table 2
summarizes the nature and status of these claims.
259 See id.
260 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, Dom. Rep.-Ctr.
Am., Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-
dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fla/final-text [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
261 Renco Grp., Inc. v. Republic of Peru, Notice of Intent to Commence Arbitration
(Dec. 29, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/RencoGroupVPeruNOI.pdf.
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Table 2: Claims brought under CAFTA-DR and U.S.-Peru TPA 26 2
Alleged Status of
Invest. Treaty Claim
Parties Tribunal Treaty Sector Violations (June 2012)
TCW Group, UNCITR CAFTA- Electricity MFN, Nat'l Settled
Inc. v. Dom. AL DR distribution treatment, (consent award
Rep.263 FET,264 issued July
Expropri- 2009)
ation
262 Jarrod Hepburn, As Peruvian Citizens Sue U.S. Mining Investors for
Environmental Harms, Mining Company Makes Good on Threat, INV. ARB. RPTR. (May
17, 2011), http://www.iareporter.com/categories/20110305 (last visited Oct. 7, 2012)
(subscription required); Luke Eric Peterson, Mining Investor's Lack of Funding Puts
CAFTA Arbitration on Ice, INV. ARB. REP. (Dec. 31, 2011),
http://www.iareporter.com/categories/20110305 (subscription required) [hereinafter
Peterson, Mining Investors]; Luke Eric Peterson, U.S. Electricity Company Requests
Arbitration for Alleged Breaches of CAFTA by Guatemala, INV. ARB. REP. (Nov. 25,
2010), http://www.iareporter.com/categories/20100326 2 (subscription required); Press
Release, Renco Group, Inc., Government of Peru's Actions Toward Doe Run Peru Said
to Violate Trade Treaty Between United States and Peru (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://www.rencogroup.net/press0105201 I.php.
The chart was compiled by conducting searches for claims brought against parties to
the BITs and FTAs referred to in supra notes 204-205. The following websites were
consulted: INT'L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES,
http://icsid.worldbank.orgICSID/Index.jsp; INv. TREATY ARB., http://www.italaw.com;
INv. ARB. REP., http://www.iareporter.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
263 TCW Grp., Inc. v. Dom. Republic Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim
(Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0832.pdf;
TCW Grp., Inc. v. Dom. Rep., Consent Award (July 16, 2009),
http://italaw.com/documents/TD-DRConsentAward_001 .PDF.
264 FET stands for fair and equitable treatment. Claimants also alleged violation of
the obligation to provide full protection and security, which, along with fair and
equitable treatment, is the minimum standard of treatment guaranteed under CAFTA-DR
art. 10.5. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 260, art 10.5.
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265 Commerce Grp. Corp. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17,
Notice of Arbitration (July 2, 2009); Commerce Grp. Corp. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID
Case No. ARB/09/17, Award (Mar. 14, 2011).
266 Request for Institution of Arbitration Proceedings, R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic
of Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23 (June 14, 2007),
http://dace.mineco.gob.gt/dacepdf/doc3expl6dace07.pdf [hereinafter Request for
Arbitration, R.R. Dev. Corp.]; R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Guat., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/23, Award (June 29, 2012).
267 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12,
Notice of Arbitration (Apr. 30, 2009); Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal.,




Parties Tribunal Treaty Sector Violations (June 2012)
Commerce ICSID CAFTA- Mining MFN, Nat'l Dismissed for
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Railroad ICSID CAFTA- Railway Nat'l Award issued
Dev. Corp. v. DR treatment, June 2012,
Rep. of FET, Expro- finding breach
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Alleged Status of
Invest. Treaty Claim
Parties Tribunal Treaty Sector Violations (June 2012)




Renco UNCITR U.S.- Mining National Pending
Group, Inc. AL Peru treatment,
v. Rep. of TPA FET,
Peru 269  Expro-
priation
Two disputes brought against El Salvador under CAFTA-DR,
Commerce Group Corp. v. Republic of El Salvador and Pac Rim
Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, show how the procedural
innovations in CAFTA-DR have altered the dynamics of the
investor-state arbitration process.2 70  Commerce Group illustrates
the use of CAFTA-DR's expedited procedure to decide
preliminary objections.271 Shortly after the tribunal was
constituted, El Salvador filed a preliminary objection2 72 asserting
that Commerce Group had allowed domestic court proceedings in
El Salvador to continue with respect to the same measure that it
challenged in arbitration, rendering the request for arbitration
invalid pursuant to CAFTA-DR's waiver provision.273  The
268 TECO Guat. Holdings LLC v. Republic of Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23,
Procedural Details.
269 Claimant's Notice of Intent to Commence Arbitration, Renco Grp., Inc. v.
Republic of Peru (Dec. 29, 2010), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/RencoGroupVPeru NOI.pdf.
270 Commerce Grp., ICSID Case No. ARB 09/17, Award; Pac Rim Cayman, ICSID
Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on Respondent's Jurisdictional Objections.
271 See Commerce Grp., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Award, 34.
272 Similar to the 2004 Model BIT, paragraphs four and five of CAFTA-DR's art.
10.20 allow the respondent to raise a preliminary objection to claimant's claim, and
provide an expedited procedure for the tribunal to decide such objection. See 2004
Model BIT, supra note 194.
273 See Commerce Grp., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Award, 1 33, 66. CAFTA-
DR's waiver requirement conditions an investor-state arbitration claim on the claimant
submitting a written waiver of its right to continue any proceeding before a local court or
tribunal with respect to the measure challenged under the treaty. CAFTA-DR, supra
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tribunal ultimately agreed and dismissed the claim for lack of
jurisdiction,27 4 relying in part on briefs submitted to the tribunal by
other CAFTA-DR states in favor of El Salvador's position.275
Commerce Group filed a request with ICSID to annul the
tribunal's award, but the request was stayed for failure to pay an
advance on costs.2 76
Pac Rim demonstrates how CAFTA-DR's rules regarding
transparency and public participation facilitate the involvement of
NGOs and other interested parties in the investor-state dispute
settlement process. 2 77  First, CAFTA-DR's transparency
requirements278 greatly enhance the availability of information
regarding Pac Rim and other CAFTA-DR disputes.279 In May
note 260, art. 10.1 8(2)(b). The tribunal interpreted the waiver requirement as requiring
the investor not only to submit the written waiver but also to discontinue such domestic
proceedings. Commerce Grp., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Award, 80.
274 See Commerce Grp., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Award, 115.
275 See id. 81-82 (citing the submissions of Costa Rica and Nicaragua pursuant
to CAFTA-DR art. 10.20(2)). The tribunal found that the investor's claim was not
frivolous, such that Commerce Group was required to bear only half of the costs and its
own legal fees associated with the proceeding. Id. T 137-39.
276 See Peterson, Mining Investors, supra note 262.
277 See Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12,
Public Hearing (May 2-4, 2011), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&Fro
mPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement89 [hereinafter Public Hearing, Pac
Rim Cayman LLC].
278 CAFTA-DR, supra note 260, art. 10.21 (strongly resembling 2004 Model BIT,
supra note 194, art. 29).
279 CAFTA-DR art. 10.21(1) imposes the document publication requirement on
respondent. Some documents have not been made promptly and publicly available. For
example, although ICSID registered TECO's claim against Guatemala in November
2010, as of August 2011, it appears that neither the notice of intent nor the pleadings
were yet available online. See TECO Guat. Holdings LLC v. Republic of Guat., ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/23, Procedural Details.
However, relevant documents pertaining to concluded and pending CAFTA-DR
claims generally are publicly available on the internet. The Investment Treaty
Arbitration website provides links to such documents, including documentation
pertaining to all of the disputes listed in Table 2 (with the exception of TECO v.
Guatemala). See INV. TREATY ARB., http://www.italaw.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
As for Pac Rim, substantially all of the documentation required by Article 10.21(1)
appears to be available online, including the notice of intent, notice of arbitration,
respondent's preliminary objections and responses thereto, expert opinions, witness
statements, the tribunal's decision on preliminary objections, respondent's objections to
jurisdiction, and the application of amici to participate in the proceeding. See id.
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2011, ICSID recorded the Pac Rim tribunal's hearing on
respondent's preliminary objections to jurisdiction, which ICSID
made available to the public for streaming on its website in
English and Spanish.280
Additionally, as a dispute implicating the public interest in
environmental protection, Pac Rim attracted the attention of
several NGOs, which successfully petitioned the tribunal for leave
to submit an amicus brief.28 1 Pac Rim sought compensation for
breaches of CAFTA-DR's fair and equitable treatment and non-
discrimination obligations, and of the guarantee against
expropriation.28 2 It alleged that the Salvadorian government
induced it to spend millions of dollars to undertake gold and silver
mining exploration activities and, years later, refused to grant it an
environmental permit or conclude the mining concession.28 3
According to amici briefs, however, the government's reluctance
to issue new mining permits was in response to intense public
opposition to metals mining and to legitimate concerns raised
regarding the negative environmental and social effects of Pac
Rim's exploratory activities.28 A group of eight local NGOs,
operating under the banner "La Mesa," 285 submitted an application
for permission to proceed as amici curiae in the arbitration, as
allowed under CAFTA-DR.28 6 The tribunal granted La Mesa
280 See Public Hearing, Pac Rim Cayman LLC, supra note 277.
281 See, e.g., Application for Permission to Proceed as Amici Curiae at 6, Pac Rim
Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 (Mar. 2, 2001)
[hereinafter Application to Proceed as Amici Curiae, Pac Rim Cayman LLC], available
at http://italaw.com/documents/PAC RIMAmicus_2Mar1_Eng.pdf.
282 CAFTA-DR, supra note 260, arts. 10.3 (national treatment), 10.4 (most-favored
nation treatment), 10.5 (fair and equitable treatment), 10.7 (expropriation).
Substantively, these provisions are almost identical to the analogous provisions of the
2004 Model BIT, except that CAFTA-DR makes some adjustments to the standard for
compensation to investors for loss resulting from armed conflict or civil strife. See 2004
Model BIT, supra note 194, arts. 3-6.
283 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12,
Notice of Arbitration, i1 7-9 (Apr. 30, 2009).
284 Application to Proceed as Amici Curiae, Pac Rim Cayman LLC, supra note
281, at 6.
285 La Mesa is short for Mesa Nacional Frente a la Mineria Metblica de El Salvador
(National Roundtable Against Metallic Mining). Id. at 1.
286 CAFTA-DR, like the 2004 Model BIT, authorizes the arbitral tribunal to
consider and accept amicus submissions from non-disputing parties. CAFTA-DR, supra
note 260, art. 10.20(3); see also 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, at art. 28(3).
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permission to file an amicus submission on the condition that the
submission be edited to address only the jurisdictional issues
currently before the tribunal.287
A different CAFTA-DR dispute, RDC v. Guatemala, provided
a tribunal with the first opportunity to interpret CAFTA-DR's
guarantees against indirect expropriation and of fair and equitable
treatment. 2 88  In 1997, RDC won a public bid for a fifty-year
concession to rebuild and operate Guatemala's narrow gauge
railroad system.28 The concession included a right of way
contract and a rail equipment lease contract. 290 After operating the
concession for seven years, RDC's Guatemalan subsidiary filed
arbitration claims against the government for breach of contract,
alleging failure to adhere to certain obligations related to the
concession. 291' Fourteen months later, Guatemala's president
issued a decree declaring the rail equipment lease contract
"injurious to the interests of the state" and void.2 92 RDC alleged
that the decree was issued in order to force RDC's subsidiary to
withdraw from the arbitration and ultimately to redistribute RDC's
interest in the concession to other investors.293 The tribunal
rejected RDC's claims of expropriation and discriminatory
29treatment.29 It agreed, however, that the presidential decree was
"arbitrary, grossly unfair, and unjust," thereby breaching CAFTA-
DR Article 10.5, the minimum standard of treatment (or fair and
equitable treatment) provision.295 The tribunal took notice of the
third-party submissions of the United States, El Salvador, and
287 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12,
Procedural Order No. 8 (Mar. 23, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/
PacRim ElSalvadorProceduralOrderNo8.pdf. Although the brief attached to La Mesa's
application primarily was directed to the merits of the dispute, La Mesa's arguments on
the merits will presumably be re-submitted for consideration during the merits phase if
there is one.
288 See Request for of Arbitration, R.R. Dev. Corp., supra note 266, fT 54-69.





294 R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, T.
152-55 (June 29, 2012).
295 Id T 235.
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Honduras, which emphasized that Article 10.5 should be
interpreted as requiring a minimum standard of treatment under
customary international law, based on state practice and opinio
juris.296 At the same time, the tribunal found that customary
international law is not static; rather, it is a developing standard.29 7
Between Pac Rim and RDC, the merits of the Pac Rim dispute
attracted more public attention since it raised more difficult
questions of how to balance host state regulatory interests against
investment protection.298 RDC, in contrast, involved a relatively
uncontroversial challenge to a government decree nullifying a
crucial contract underlying RDC's investment.2 99 In June 2012,
however, the Pac Rim tribunal dismissed the investor's CAFTA-
DR claims on the basis of the treaty's denial of benefits clause,3 00
finding that Pac Rim was a shell holding company under Canadian
ownership with no substantial business activities in the United
States.3 0 ' The tribunal, however, did allow Pac Rim's Salvadoran
investment law claims to proceed to the merits.3 02
To conclude, application and interpretation of the new
generation of U.S. FTAs and BITs is still a work in progress. The
controversial claim that Philip Morris International (PMI) filed
against Uruguay30 3 highlights what is at stake with the shift in U.S.
BIT practice. In February 2010, PMI filed a request for
arbitration, alleging that tobacco packaging requirements
(mandating the use of graphic photos and very large printed
warnings), adopted by Uruguay to warn of the health effects of
296 Id. 1 207-11.
297 Id. 218.
298 The dispute has been reported in the New York Times. See Randal C. Archibold,
First a Gold Rush, Then the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2011, at A6 (discussing the
controversy surrounding Pac Rim's investment arbitration claim).
299 See Request for Arbitration, R.R. Dev. Corp., supra note 266, at 15-20.
300 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 260, art. 10.12(2) (allowing a party to deny treaty
benefits to an investor if persons of a non-CAFTA-DR state own or control the enterprise
and the investor has no "substantial business activities" in the party's territory).
301 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12,
Decision on the Respondent's Jurisdictional Objections, 4.68, 4.82 (June 1, 2012).
302 Id. 5.48.
303 Request for Arbitration, Philip Morris Brand Shrl, et al. v. Oriental Republic of
Uru., ICSID Case. No. ARB/I0/7, 33-42, 77 (Feb. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Request for
Arbitration, Philip Morris], available at http://www.italaw.com/documents/PMI-
UruguayNoA.pdf.
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smoking, violate the 1988 Switzerland-Uruguay BIT.304 It may be
that applicability of the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT to the dispute is
a mere fortuity; the U.S.-based Altria Group's spin-off of PMI in
2008 was driven by numerous factors, including avoiding FDA
regulation of tobacco products.30 5 Nonetheless, a significant
benefit to PMI of the corporate restructuring was that it became a
Swiss investor, and, as such, could invoke the protections of the
Switzerland-Uruguay BIT in its dispute with Uruguay (as opposed
to the U.S.-Uruguay BIT, concluded on the basis of the 2004
Model BIT).306 PMI alleges that the packaging requirements
constitute an indirect expropriation of its trademark rights.30' PMI
also argues that the measures violate the fair and equitable
treatment standard because they are inconsistent with its
"legitimate expectations" of a stable regulatory framework and
with the TRIPs Agreement.308 These arguments would be quite
difficult to make under the U.S.-Uruguay BIT, which limits the
fair and equitable treatment standard and clarifies that most non-
discriminatory health-related regulation is not expropriatory.0 *
304 Id. One of the claimants is Abal Hermanos, S.A., a Uruguay-based company
that markets PMI products in Uruguay and is owned by a PMI affiliate. Id. at 14-15.
For a discussion of PMI's investment arbitration claim, see Matthew C. Porterfield &
Christopher R. Barnes, Philip Morris v. Uruguay on cigarette branding: Will Investor-
State Arbitration Send Restrictions on Tobacco Marketing up in Smoke?, INV. TREATY
NEWS, at 3-6 (July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-moris-v-
uruguay-will-investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-
smoke/; see also Luke Eric Peterson, Uruguay: Philip Morris Files First-Known
Investment Treaty Claim Against Tobacco Regulations, INv. ARB. REP. (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20100303 (last visited Oct. 7, 2011) (subscription
required).
The BIT that PMI is invoking is the Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Switz.-Uru., Oct. 7, 1988. For a reference to the Switzerland-
Uruguay BIT, see Request for Arbitration, Philip Morris, supra note 304, 1 1 n.1 (full
text of the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT is available in Spanish at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/URU France s.pdf).
305 See Ruthie Ackerman, Altria Seals Spinoff Deal, FORBES.COM (Jan. 30, 2008),
http://www.forbes.com/2008/01/30/altria-philipmorris-cigarettes-markets-equity-cx-ra-
0130markets24.html.
306 See Porterfield & Barnes, supra note 304, at 7.
307 Request for Arbitration, Philip Morris, supra note 304, 83.
308 Id. 84-85.
309 The U.S.-Uruguay BIT's provisions on fair and equitable treatment and
expropriation are identical to those in the 2004 model. Treaty Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., arts. 4, 5 &
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III. EMEs as Capital Exporters and Their Approach to BITs
A. EMEs as Capital Exporters
Twenty years ago, the United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations observed that investors from the United States and
the European Community no longer dominated global outward
FDI (OFDI) stocks and flows.3 10 In other words, the preexisting
bipolar3 1' pattern of OFDI had been replaced with the "triad" of
the United States, the European Community, and Japan.312 Today,
scholars Persephone Economou and Karl Sauvant note that this
characterization needs to be revisited because EMEs as a group
have replaced Japan as the third pole in the triad.313 In particular,
the EMEs' share of global OFDI stocks3 14 increased to 16% in
2009, and their share of OFDI flows"' increased to 25% from
Annexes A, B, Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
uploads/agreements/bit/asset upload _file748 9005.pdf. For a discussion of the 2004
model's revisions to the fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation standards,
see supra notes 224-230 and accompanying text.
310 See U.N. Ctr. on Transnat'1 Corp., Salient Features and Trends in Foreign Direct
Investment, at 70, U.N. Doc ST/CTC/14 (1983).
311 To qualify as a "pole," a country or group of countries must account for at least
ten percent of global OFDI stocks or flows. Economou & Sauvant, supra note 23.
312 U.N. Ctr. on Transnat'l Corp., World Investment Rep. 1991: The Triad in
Foreign Direct Investment, U.N. Doc. No. ST/CTC/1 18 (Aug. 1991), cited in Economou
& Sauvant, supra note 23, at n.i.
313 Economou & Sauvant, supra note 23.
314 FDI stock is defined as "the value of the share of capital and reserves (including
retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of
affiliates to their parent enterprises." U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
Notes on Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment Stock, Annual, 1980-2011
[hereinafter U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Notes], available at
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?Reportld=89 (last visited Oct.
7,2012).
FDI is defined as "an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a
lasting interest in and control by a resident entity in one country (foreign direct investor
or parent enterprise) of an enterprise resident in a different economy (FDI enterprise)."
Id.
315 FDI outflows are defined as capital provided (either directly or through other
related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to a FDI enterprise. FDI includes three
components: equity capital, reinvested earnings, and intra-company loans. U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, Notes on Inward and Outward Foreign Direct
Investment Flows, Annual, 1970-2011, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/
tableView.aspx?Reportld=88 (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
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2007 to 2009.316 Although EMEs--defined to include any
economy that is not a "developed economy" 317-are a broad and
diverse group of countries, the vast majority of outward FDI
comes from the top twenty EME capital-exporters.3 18 Graph 1
shows the OFDI stocks of the ten most significant capital-
exporting EMEs as of 2010, compared with their OFDI stocks in
2000. It demonstrates that, as of 2010, Russian companies had
invested close to half a trillion U.S. dollars in companies abroad.
Indian companies, which had invested less than $2 billion abroad
by 2000, within ten years increased their OFDI stocks forty-six-
fold, to over $92 billion, within ten years.
316 Economou & Sauvant, supra note 23.
317 See supra note 23 (defining EMEs).
318 Twenty EMEs accounted for 85% of OFDI from all EMEs from 2005 to 2009
(excluding tax havens). Id.
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EMEs as a group constitute a significant and rapidly growing
source of OFDI. However, a relatively limited subset of EMEs,
including Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs)3 20 and
several others, account for most of this investment. Six of these
economies (Hong Kong, China, Russia, Singapore, Korea, and
319 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development World Investment Report 2011:
Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development, Annex tbl.1.2, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2011 (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNCTAD Report 2011). Tax
havens British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands are excluded from the graph. The
data on China excludes OFDI from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The data on OFDI
from China and Hong Kong may be inflated, as the data do not exclude FDI that is
exported from China to Hong Kong and Macao only to be "round-tripped" back into
China. Economou & Sauvant, supra note 23, at n.iv. The data on Russia may be
inflated for a similar reason: it does not exclude FDI that is "round-tripped" back to
Russia through a haven such as Cyprus or the Netherlands. Alexey Kuznetsov, Outward
FDI from Russia and its Policy Context, Update 2011, COLUMBIA FDI PROFILES 2-3
(Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.vcc.columbia.edulfiles/vale/documents/
ProfileRussiaOFDI_-_2 August 2011 FINAL.pdf.
320 In 2003, the investment banking firm Goldman Sachs issued a provocative
report predicting that by the year 2040, the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China
may together surpass in U.S. dollar terms those of the G6 (United States, United
Kingdom, Germany, Japan, France, and Italy). Dominic Wilson and Roopa
Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL
EcoNoMICs PAPER No. 99 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/topics/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf.
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India) were among the top twenty capital-exporting economies
worldwide (in terms of global FDI outflows) in 2010.321 Another
six of these economies (China, Hong Kong, Brazil, Russia,
Singapore, and India) were also among the top fifteen recipients of
FDI inflows worldwide in 2010.322 The following section
describes the BIT practice of the most significant EME capital
exporters, with a particular focus on the BRICs.
B. BIT Practice ofEME Capital Exporters
1. Generally
Table 3 provides general information regarding the BIT
practice of the capital-exporting countries featured in Graph I
above. Although they are significant exporters of FDI, Taiwan
and Hong Kong are not included in the table because these
economies' statuses in relation to China uniquely affect their
respective treaty practices. 323
321 UNCTAD Report 2011, supra note 319, at 9 fig.1.9.
322 Id. at 4 fig.I.4.
323 Neither Taiwan (the Republic of China or ROC) nor China (the People's
Republic of China or PRC) claim to be separate countries, but rather, both claim to be
sovereign of both territories. In 1970, the United Nations ordered that the ROC's seat be
transferred to the PRC; in 1979, the United States established full diplomatic relations
with the PRC. See N.Y. Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enter., Inc., 954 F.2d 847,
850 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the history of the ROC's sovereign status). Since all but a
few states recognize the PRC as sovereign of China, Taiwan has concluded relatively
few BITs. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., Total Number of Bilateral
Investment Agreements Concluded: Taiwan Province of China (June 1, 2012),
http://archive.unctad.org/sections/dite pcbb/docs/bitstaiwan.pdf (last visited Oct. 7,
2012) (listing 16 BITs in force).
As a special administrative region of China since 1997, Hong Kong has been
granted certain treaty-making authority by the PRC government, and Hong Kong has
concluded a number of BITs under that authority. See Zeng Huaqun, Initiative and
Implications of Hong Kong's Bilateral Investment Treaties, 11(5) J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 669, 672-73, 679 tbl.1 (2010). There remains the possibility, however, that as a
region within the territory of China, Hong Kong investors, at least those with Chinese
nationality, might also be entitled to invoke the protections of China's BITs and FTAs.
In Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, the tribunal found that a Chinese national who had
resided in Hong Kong since 1972 was entitled to invoke the protections of the China-
Peru BIT. The tribunal observed that there is nothing in the treaty text that excludes
Hong Kong residents from the scope of application of the treaty. Tza Yap Shum v.
Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence,
ff 71-74, 76 (June 19, 2009).
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chapters in force (as
Country BITs concluded 324  BITs in force325  of 2011)326
Russia 71 51 0327
China 128 101 6
Singapore 41 35 15
Brazil 14 0 0328
South Korea 90 82 5
India 83 67 4
Malaysia 67 49 6
South Africa 46 23 0329
324 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 323.
325 Id.
326 The WTO maintains a searchable database of FTAs in force based on
notifications it receives from WTO members. The database indicates which of these
agreements covers investment protection. See WORLD TRADE ORG., REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS INFORMATION SYSTEM, http://rtais.wto.org/Ul/PublicMaintain
RTAHome.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2012). However, not all of the agreements listed on
the database have been indexed by topic. Additionally, although the website may list an
FTA as covering investment, the FTA may not provide the kinds of specific investment
protection commitments that are found in a BIT. For these reasons, the table provides
only an estimate of the number of FTAs with investment chapters in force.
327 As of 2011, Russia was not yet a WTO member. Russia concluded FTAs with
other CIS countries following the break-up of the Soviet Union and concluded
agreements with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic providing for formation
of a customs union. These agreements, however, do not appear to address investment
protection. WTO Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation,
Information on the Treatment Provided under Preferential Agreements, 11 1-2,
WT/ACC/RUS/21 (Nov. 21, 1997).
328 Although the Colonia and Buenos Aires Protocols were concluded in 1994 to
provide BIT-like protections to foreign investors, they are not yet in force. See Protocolo
de Colonia para a Promoqio e a Proteglo Reciproca de Investimentos no MERCOSUL
[Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment within
MERCOSUR], Aug. 5, 1994, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
Trade/MRCSR/colonia/pcoloniap.asp (showing status of protocol); Noah D. Rubins,
Investment Arbitration in Brazil, 4 J. WORLD INV. 1071, 1088-90 (2003) (describing
MERCOSUR and the significance of the protocols).
329 Although the WTO website lists the EFTA-SACU FTA (an FTA among the
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Table 3 shows that, of the largest capital-exporting EMEs, all
but one have numerous BITs and FTAs in force. Indeed, most of
these countries have a number of investment protection
agreements in force comparable to or greater than that of the
United States.33 0 The notable exception in Graph 1 is Brazil. It is
the only country listed that has no investment protection
agreements in force. 33 ' Brazil's situation is discussed in more
detail below.3 3 2
Of course, the data in Table 3 do not explain why most of the
largest capital-exporting EMEs conclude BITs. The traditional
explanation as to why EMEs conclude BITs (attracting foreign
investment)333 may continue to play a role. Additionally, in recent
decades, most EMEs have undergone profound economic reforms
that have generated domestic pressures to improve their
investment climates, to which governments respond, in part, by
negotiating BITs and FTAs. 334  But it is likely that an emerging
factor behind EME activity, with respect to BITs and FTAs, is the
significant and recent increase of OFDI by EME investors and,
consequently, the growing interest on the part of EME
governments in protecting their investors abroad.
2. BRICs
a. China
With over 100 BITs currently in force, China has one of the
European Free Trade Association states and the states of the Southern Africa Customs
Union) as covering investment, the agreement contains no specific investment
guarantees. See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 326.
330 As of 2012, the United States has 48 BITs in force. See Bilateral Investment
Treaties, USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last
visited Oct. 18, 2012) (providing a link to "Bilateral Investment Treaties Currently in
Force (from the Trade Compliance Center)" that lists 48 BITs). Though the U.S.-Bolivia
BIT was terminated in June 2012, this BIT is included in this number as it will continue
to apply to covered investments made prior to termination. BITs and Related
Agreements, supra note 197. The United States also currently has 11 FTAs with
investment chapters in force. See USTR, Free Trade Agreements, supra note 204.
331 WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 326.
332 See infra notes 382-404 and accompanying text.
333 See Echandi, supra note 53, at 5-6.
334 Id. at 6.
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largest BIT programs in the world.33 5 In contrast to its pro-
investor approach to BITs and FTAs today, China's initial BIT
practice in the 1980s was relatively conservative, especially with
respect to investor-state dispute settlement.3  Until the late 1990s,
Chinese BITs, if they allowed for arbitration of investor-state
disputes at all, 3  only provided for the arbitration of disputes
"involving the amount of compensation for expropriation." 3 38
Consistent with this restrictive jurisdictional approach, when
China acceded to the ICSID Convention in 1993, it notified ICSID
that it would only consider submitting "disputes over
compensation resulting from expropriation and nationalization" to
ICSID jurisdiction.33 9
Beginning around 1998, China liberalized its approach,
concluding BITs with broad investor-state dispute settlement
clauses.34 0 China's current model BIT provides for ICSID
335 As of the end of 2008, China was second only to Germany worldwide in terms
of the number of BITs it had concluded. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2008-June 2009), 3 IlA
MONITOR at 1, 3 fig.2 (2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Recent Developments], available at
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf
336 See Chinese Model BIT Version I, art. 9(3), in NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA
SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE, at Appendix I (2009);
Chinese Model BIT Version II, art. 9(3), in id. at Appendix III.
337 A few early Chinese BITs did not provide at all for arbitration of investor-state
disputes. See Elodie Dulac & John Savage, The Asia Pacific Arbitration Review 2007:
China BITs, ASIA PAC. ARB. REV. (2007) (citing the China-Thailand, China-Romania,
and China-Sweden BITs as examples, but also noting that the China-Sweden BIT was
subsequently amended).
338 See Chinese Model BIT Version 1, supra note 336, art. 9(3); Chinese Model BIT
Version II, supra note 336, art. 9(3).
339 ICSID Secretariat, Contracting States and Measures Taken by Them for the
Purpose of the Convention: Notifications Concerning Classes of Disputes Considered
Suitable or Unsuitable for Submission to the Centre, ICSID/8-D at 1 (July 2012),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH
&actionVal=ShowDocument&Measures=True&language=English. China's notification
was made on January 7, 1993, pursuant to the ICSID Convention, which allows any
contracting state at the time of ratification to provide notice of the classes of disputes it
would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of ICSID. ICSID Convention, supra
note 50, art. 25(4).
340 See Draft New Model BIT, § III, in GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note
336, at Appendix V (displaying § III of China's new model BIT draft pertaining
to investor-state dispute settlement) (displaying § III of China's new model BIT draft
pertaining to investor-state dispute settlement).
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arbitration of "any legal dispute" between an investor and the host
state "in connection with an investment" in the host state's
territory.34' By the late 1990s, China was already attracting
rapidly increasing amounts of inward FDI, notwithstanding the
narrow dispute settlement clauses in its early BITs.3 42 However, in
1998 China launched its "going abroad" strategy, a strategy that
emphasized the promotion of outward FDI over export trade.343
Consequently, by the late 1990s, flows of outward FDI from China
were also beginning to increase, and surged dramatically by the
mid-2000s.34 4 Thus, one of the factors behind the Chinese
government's willingness to liberalize its BIT regime in 1998 was
its new policy of promoting OFDI.3 45
Ironically, China's first known investor to file an investment
arbitration claim was forced to defend a jurisdictional challenge
based on the narrow scope of the dispute settlement provision of
the 1994 China-Peru BIT.34 6 In Tza Yap Shum v. Republic ofPeru,
Mr. Tza Yap Shum, a Chinese investor in a Peruvian fish-based
food products company, filed a request for arbitration alleging that
the actions of Peru's tax authorities breached several provisions of
the China-Peru BIT.3 47 Peru challenged the tribunal's jurisdiction
to hear the claim, arguing among other things that the BIT limits
consent to investor-state arbitration to disputes over the amount of
341 This clause can be found in the current Chinese Model BIT (Version III). Id. at
app. TV. The first BIT concluded under the current model was the 1998 China-Barbados
BIT. Id. at 1 1.78.
342 Inward FDI stocks in China doubled from $101 billion in 1995 to $203 billion
in 2001. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Notes, supra note 314. Inward FDI
stocks in Hong Kong also almost doubled during the same period (from $228 billion to
$419 billion). Id
343 Congyan Cai, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty
Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12(2) J. INT'L ECON.
L. 457, 459 (2009).
344 OFDI flows from China averaged about $2.3 billion annually throughout the
1990s, and then surged to $12.3 billion in 2005, $52 billion in 2008, and $68 billion in
2010. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Notes, supra note 314.
345 GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 336, at 41.
346 Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Competence, 311, 165 (June 19, 2009).
347 Id. %1 30-31. (showing Mr. Tza Yap Shum alleged violations of the
expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and transfers provisions of the BIT).
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compensation for expropriation.348 The tribunal issued an interim
award upholding its jurisdiction to hear the expropriation claim.349
Although it upheld its jurisdiction to hear the expropriation claim,
the tribunal dismissed the investor's other claims for lack of
jurisdiction, finding that the most-favored nation provision of the
BIT could not be read to "override" the narrow scope of the
dispute settlement provision.o In July 2011, the tribunal issued
an award on the merits, finding that Peru had breached the
expropriation guarantee of the BIT and awarding Mr. Tza Yap
Shum $786,000."' The award was substantially less than the $25
million the investor was seeking.35 2
A group of Chinese investors in a Mongolian iron ore mine
recently filed another investment arbitration claim, alleging that
Mongolia's cancellation of an important license breached the 1991
China-Mongolia BIT.153  Although details of this arbitration have
not yet been made public, it is quite possible that Mongolia will
challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction on similar grounds to those
raised by Peru in Tza Yap Shum. The China-Mongolia BIT,
348 Id. 129. In support of this argument, Peru submitted the witness statement of
Chinese law expert Professor An Chen, who stated that the China-Peru BIT, like dozens
of BITs concluded during the early 1990s, only allowed for investor-state arbitration
where a domestic court had determined that an expropriation had occurred but the
amount of compensation owed to the investor remained in dispute. Id. 131.
349 Id. 221. The tribunal reasoned that the phrase "involving the amount of
compensation for expropriation" in the BIT should be read as encompassing not only a
tribunal's determination of the amount due to the investor but also determining whether
an expropriation had taken place. Id. 188.
350 Id. 220. Mr. Tza Yap Shum invoked the most-favored nation provision of the
BIT, arguing that the benefit of broader dispute settlement provisions extended to
investors under Peruvian BITs should also be available to him. Id. IT 189-91. For a
critique of the tribunal's reasoning (but not the outcome) on this issue, see Andrew
Newcombe, Another Misapplication of MFN? Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru,
KLUWERARBITRATIONBLOG.COM (Oct. 21, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/
2009/10/21 /another-misapplication-of-mfn-tza-yap-shum-v-the-republic-of-peru/.
351 Luke Eric Peterson & Jonathan Bonnitcha, New Government in Peru Confronts
Recent Arbitration Loss, and New Claims by Foreign Investors in Electricity
Transmission, Construction and Port Sectors, INV. ARB. REP. (Aug. 4, 2011)
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110805 (subscription required).
352 Id.
353 Luke Eric Peterson, Tribunal Chosen to Hear Ad-Hoc Arbitration by Chinese
Mining Investors Against Republic of Mongolia, INV. ARB. REP. (Nov. 4, 2010)
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20101105 4 (subscription required).
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similar to other early Chinese BITs, contains a narrow dispute
settlement clause, limiting consent to investor-state arbitration to
disputes involving the amount of compensation for
expropriation.354
To summarize, China has concluded more BITs and FTAs than
almost any other country, and the content of these treaties has
liberalized over time, partly in response to increasing quantities of
Chinese OFDI. China is also in BIT negotiations with the United
States, as discussed below."' The Tza Yap Shum dispute
illustrates how Chinese investors in other countries are beginning
to invoke the protections of China's BITs.
b. India
India's industrial policy underwent profound change in the
1990s as the government adopted measures to deregulate the
economy, liberalize trade, and promote FDI."' Since 1992, the
government has progressively relaxed restrictions on outward
investment.3 57 One consequence of this policy has been an
extraordinary increase in India's OFDI: from around $2 billion in
2000 to $92 billion in 2010." Although Indian firms tended to
invest in other developing countries in the past, today they
increasingly invest in developed countries, as illustrated by Tata
Motors's 2008 acquisition of British companies Jaguar and Land
Rover.359
The Indian government's economic liberalization policy has
included what Prabhash Ranjan and Deepak Raju describe as a
354 Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Mong., art. 8, Aug. 26, 1991, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china-mongolia.pdf (last visited Oct. 8,
2011).
355 See infra Part IV and note 432.
356 Prema-Chandra Athukorala, Outward Foreign Direct Investment from India,
26(2) ASIAN DEV. REV. 125, 129 (2009).
357 Id. at 129-30.
358 See supra Graph 1.
359 See the discussion of Tata Motors in Part 1, supra note 24 and accompanying
text. The developed country share of approved OFDI by Indian multinational companies
increased from 13.9% during the period before 1990 to 53.8% in 2002-2006.
Athukorala, supra note 356, at 135 tbl.2.
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"gigantic" BIT and FTA program."'o India has concluded eighty-
two BITs3 6' and four FTAs with investment chapters and is in
negotiations with many other countries to conclude additional
agreements.36 2 Additionally, the terms of these BITs are strongly
pro-investor, including most, if not all, of the investment
protections described in Part II.A.363 India is also in negotiations
with the United States to conclude a BIT.3* Although
negotiations had stalled due to a stalemate within the Obama
Administration regarding review of the U.S. Model BIT,365 reports
suggest that negotiations between the United States and India have
resumed with respect to aspects of the BIT that are not likely to
change in the model BIT review.366
360 Prabhash Ranjan & Deepak Raju, The Enigma of Enforceability of Investment
Treaty Arbitration Awards in India, 6 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 5 (2011). The authors noted
that International Investment Agreements (HAs) "as a generic term, [include] Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs) [and] investment chapters in Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs)." Id. at I ln.1.
361 See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEv., Total Number of Bilateral
Investment Agreements Concluded: India (June 1, 2012),
http://unctad.org/Sections/ditepcbb/docsfbits india.pdf; see also supra Table 3.
362 See Ranjan & Raju, supra note 360, at 6-7; see also Prabash Ranjan, Indian
Investment Treaty Programme in the Light of Global Experiences, 45 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 68, 68 (2010) (noting that India is in BIT negotiations with 25 countries in 2010);
Gov't of India, Ministry of Finance, Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreements (BIPA), http://www.finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa index.asp?pageid= I (last visited
Oct. 8, 2012).
363 See Ranjan & Raju, supra note 360, at 7 (describing Indian BIT protections as
"broad," including fair and equitable treatment, most-favored nation treatment, national
treatment, guarantees of free transfer of capital, guarantees against direct and indirect
expropriation and consent to investor-state arbitration of disputes).
364 See Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth, Advancing US. -India Economic Ties: BIT
and Beyond, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUD.: U.S.-INDIA INSIGHT (June 2012),
http://csis.org/files/publication/ 120608 WadhwaniChair USIndialnsight.pdf (discussing
the U.S. goal of supporting bilateral trade and investment opportunities between U.S. and
India).
365 See ACIEP, supra note 208.
366 An Obama administration official recently stated that unresolved issues holding
up review of the U.S. model BIT will not delay technical BIT talks with India. See U.S.,
India to Hold Technical BIT Talks Despite Ongoing US. Internal Debate, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jul. 11, 2011, j 1-6; see also Tsui, supra note 208, at 1246 (technical BIT talks
to resume with India in August 2011).
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c. Russia
Russian BIT practice dates back to the Soviet era.367 The
USSR concluded its first BIT in 1989."' Similar to Chinese
practice, some (but not all) of these early treaties were
conservative with respect to investor-state dispute settlement,
providing for arbitration of only a limited range of matters under
the treaty.369 During its period of rapid economic liberalization
under the Yeltsin regime, Russia concluded numerous BITs
containing relatively rigorous investment protections.3 70 After
Vladimir Putin was elected Russia's president in 2000, however,
367 Russia assumed the treaty obligations of the USSR upon the USSR's dissolution
in 1991. See Rein Mullerson, New Developments in the Former U.S.S.R. and
Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 299, 305 (1993).
368 Noah Rubins & Azizjon Nazarov, Investment Treaties and the Russian
Federation: Baiting the Bear?, 9 Bus. L. INT'L 100, 102 (2008).
369 See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments (with Protocol), Fed. Republic of Ger.-U.S.S.R., art. 10(1)-(3), June 13,
1989, 1707 U.N.T.S. 194 (limiting investor-state arbitration to disputes over the amount
of compensation for nationalization or the investor's right to transfer payments); cf
Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-U.S.S.R.,
art. IX(l), Nov. 20, 1989, 1852 U.N.T.S. 215 (providing for investor-state arbitration of
any dispute involving a measure taken by the host state affecting the investor's
"management, use, enjoyment or disposal" of the investment).
370 Of the 71 concluded Russian BITs reported to UNCTAD, over half were
concluded between 1992 and 1999. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., Total
Number of Bilateral Investment Agreements Concluded: Russian Federation (June 1,
2012), http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits russia.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD
Russia BIT List]. For an example of a Russian BIT of this period containing strong
investor protections, including a broad investor-state arbitration provision, see
Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Swed.-Russ.,
Apr. 19, 1995, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/sweden russia.pdf.
Russia's government adopted a model BIT in 2001 that eliminated investor
protections such as fair and equitable treatment, and limited investor-state arbitration to
situations where the parties agree to arbitrate post-dispute. Rubins & Nazarov, supra
note 368, at 104. However, BITs that Russia subsequently concluded with Thailand and
Jordan include a fair and equitable treatment commitment, and broadly provide for
investor-state arbitration of disputes. See Agreement on the Promotion on and Mutual
Protection of Investments, Russ.-Thai., arts. 2(2)-(3), 9(1)-(2), Oct. 17, 2002,
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/russia thailand.pdf (limiting fair and
equitable treatment obligation to investments that have been "specifically approved" by
the competent authority in the host state); Agreement on the Promotion and Mutual
Protection of Investments, Jordan-Russ., arts. 3(1), 8(l)-(2), Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/russiajordan ru.PDF (in Russian).
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Russia's BIT practice slowed somewhat."' It is also telling that
the BITs Russia has concluded since 1999 have predominantly
been with other EMEs.37 2
It is possible that the rapid rise in the price of oil during the
2000s, along with Russia's recovery from its 1998 financial crisis,
caused Russia's leadership to attach a lower priority to adopting
government measures to attract FDI. 3 73  Additionally, in 2005, a
group of investors in Yukos Oil Company filed massive
investment arbitration claims against Russia for breach of the
Energy Charter Treaty.374 Doubtless the Yukos claims, which if
successful could amount to as much as $100 billion,"' have
affected and will affect the Russian government's stance towards
BITs. 7 6
Nonetheless, at least since the 2008 financial crisis, Russia's
government appears to be motivated to integrate with the global
economy by concluding its WTO accession negotiations.7 The
371 Of the 71 concluded Russian BITs reported to UNCTAD, 22 were concluded
after 1999. UNCTAD Russia BIT List, supra note 370.
372 Of the 22 Russian BITs concluded after 1999, all but two were concluded with
other EMEs. Id.
373 See Rubins & Nazarov, supra note 368, at 105 (describing how a Russian
official effectively admitted that high natural resource prices and the improvement in
Russia's economy were factors behind the government's freeze in concluding new
BITs). Similarly, during this period Russia's leaders attached a low priority to
concluding pending negotiations to join the WTO, although the government has renewed
its accession efforts since the 2008 financial crisis. See John W. Miller, Russia's
Membership in World Trade Group Faces Hurdles, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2011, at A9
(describing Russia's reluctance to advocate strongly for membership in the WTO in the
past and the country's recognition that it needs to integrate with the global economy).
374 Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Fed'n, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), http://italaw.com/documentsY-ULvRussian
Federation-InterimAward-30Nov2009.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). Three Yukos
shareholders filed separate requests for arbitration in February 2005: Yukos Universal
Ltd., Hulley Enters. Ltd., and Veteran Petroleum, Ltd. Id.
375 Collectively, the three arbitration claims seek compensation of $100 billion.
Energy Charter Secretariat, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases: Yukos Universal
Ltd. v. Russ. Fed'n, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213&L=0#Yukos (last
visited Oct. 8, 2012).
376 In 2009, the arbitral tribunal upheld its jurisdiction to hear the shareholders'
claims. Yukos Universal Ltd. Interim Award, 397. Although Russia never ratified the
Energy Charter Treaty, the tribunal found that the treaty's provisions on provisional
application nonetheless bound Russia to arbitrate the investors' claims. Id. % 394-98.
377 Miller, supra note 373, at A9.
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recent surge in Russia's OFDI also seems to create incentives for
the government to protect the interests of its investors abroad
through the conclusion of BITs and FTAs."' One Russian
investor, Sergei Paushok, successfully invoked the investor-state
arbitration mechanism of the 1995 Russia-Mongolia BIT.3 7 9 In
April 2011, an arbitral tribunal found that Mongolia had breached
the fair and equitable treatment guarantee of the BIT by exporting
to a foreign account gold that Paushok's company had deposited
with the Mongolian Central Bank.380 UNCTAD's investor-state
dispute settlement database also reports that a Russian investor,
lurii Bogdanov, won an investment arbitration award against
Moldova in 2005.381
d Brazil
As stated, Brazil is unique among significant capital-exporting
EMEs for not having in force a single BIT or FTA with an
investment chapter. Although Brazil's executive branch
concluded fourteen BITs between 1994 and 1999 as part of a
broader economic liberalization strategy,382 these BITs were never
ratified. Faced with strong opposition from certain members of
Brazil's National Congress, the treaties were eventually withdrawn
from consideration.3 83 Brazil is also in the minority of countries
378 See generally UNCTAD Report 2011, supra note 319, at 9 fig.I.9 (noting
Russia's OFDI).
379 Paushok v. Gov't of Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, at 168
(UNCIT Arb. Trib. Apr. 28, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf.
380 Id % 587-96. The amount of damages owed to Paushok for breach of the BIT is
to be determined in a separate proceeding. Id. 700.
381 UNCTAD, Database of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases
(Pending and Concluded), http://unctad.org/iia-dbcases/index.html (last visited Oct. 8,
2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD Investor-State Database].
382 FILHO, supra note 164, at 3-4; see also UNCTAD, Total Number of Bilateral
Investment Agreements: Brazil (June 1, 2012), http://unctad.org/Sections/
ditepcbb/docs/bits brazil.pdf.
383 FILHO, supra note 164, at 5; see also LEANY LEMOS & DANIELA CAMPELLO, THE
NON-RATIFICATION OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: A STORY OF CONFLICT IN A
LAND OF COOPERATION 19 (Global Leaders Fellows Conference ed., May 2010) (noting
that the Brazilian BITs were withdrawn from consideration at the end of President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso's term in 2002). Lemos and Campello suggest that
Parliament's failure to ratify these BITs is particularly puzzling in light of the
concentration of power in Brazil's executive branch; between 1988 (the beginning of
Brazil's return to democracy) and 2006, the vast majority of international treaties
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worldwide not party to the ICSID Convention.3 84
There are two reasons to think that Brazil, like India and
China, may become more receptive to investment arbitration and
BITs over time. First, Brazil's policies towards arbitration have
evolved substantially over the past ten or so years.38 5 One aspect
of the fourteen concluded BITs that raised the greatest concern
with Brazil's legislators was the investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism.3 86 Since the late 1990s, however, Brazil has become a
party to the New York Convention.38 7 Although Brazil had finally
adopted a modern arbitration law by the mid-1990s, its
constitutionality was upheld by Brazil's Supreme Court only in
2001.388 Today, Brazilian companies are by far the most frequent
users of arbitration in Latin America: of the 241 disputes brought
to ICC arbitration in 2009, over one-third involved either a
submitted to Parliament were ratified, and most of those that were ratified were done
relatively quickly. Id. at 4.
384 Interestingly, neither Brazil, India, Russia, nor South Africa is party to the
ICSID Convention, although all of these states are party to the New York Convention.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. What this
means is that an investment arbitration award issued against any of these four countries
would be enforceable under the New York Convention, which allows at least some
leeway for a domestic court to refuse enforcement of the award. Id. art. V (listing
limited grounds on which a court may refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award). In contrast, ICSID awards, although subject to annulment, are
automatically enforceable within the territory of any ICSID party. See ICSID
Convention, supra note 50, art. 54(1) (requiring contracting states to recognize an
arbitral award under the Convention as binding and enforceable "as if it were a final
judgment of a court of that state").
385 See generally Rafael Villar Gagliardi & Cesar Rossi Machado, Highlights of
Arbitration Developments in Brazil, 16 IBA ARB. NEWS 112 (March 2011) (noting that
the "use of arbitration" has grown in Brazil in recent years).
386 FILHO, supra note 164, at 6; see also Jean Kalicki & Suzana Medeiros,
Investment Arbitration in Brazil: Revisiting Brazil's Traditional Reluctance Towards
ICSID, BITs, and Investor-State Arbitration, 14 REVISTA DE ARBITRAGEM E MEDIAQAO
57, 68 (2007).
387 Brazil became a party to the Convention in 2002. UNCITRAL, Status 1958-
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/NYConvention status.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
388 Arnoldo Wald & Jean Kalicki, The Settlement of Disputes Between the Public
Administration and Private Companies by Arbitration under Brazilian Law, 26 ARB.
INT'L 556, 557 (2009).
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Brazilian claimant or respondent.389  Finally, since 2005,
arbitration can even be utilized to resolve disputes between private
investors and Brazilian state agencies so long as the arbitration is
conducted in Brazil, in the Portuguese language, and in
accordance with Brazilian law.390
Second, Brazil is becoming a significant exporter as well as
importer of FDI.39 1 One factor behind Brazil's failure to ratify the
fourteen BITs concluded in the 1990s was the lack of a
sufficiently strong domestic constituency lobbying in favor of
ratification.39 2 As a result, individuals within the legislature with a
strong bias against BITs successfully organized against them.3 9 3
Some members of Parliament reasoned that Brazil would be able
to attract FDI without concluding BITs.394
Although it is certainly true that Brazil has been able to attract
FDI without BITs in force, 395 Brazilian companies are now among
the world's most significant exporters of FDI. Brazil's OFDI
stocks more than tripled between 2000 and 2010.396 While this
increase is less dramatic than Russia's or India's, it is still
significant. Companies such as Petrobras (petroleum), Vale
(mining), Gerdau (metal products), and Odebrecht (construction)
are part of a group of Brazilian companies that can now be
389 Brazilian parties were involved in 86 of the 241 disputes involving Latin
America and the Caribbean brought to ICC arbitration in 2009. ICC INT'L COURT OF
ARBITRATION, 2009 STATISTICAL REPORT 7 (2010). After Brazil, the next most frequent
user of ICC arbitration for Latin America and the Caribbean was the British Virgin
Islands, whose parties were involved in twenty-eight disputes in 2009. Id. During 1998,
in contrast, Brazilian parties were involved in only five ICC arbitrations. ICC INT'L
COURT OF ARBITRATION, 1998 STATISTICAL REPORT 5 (1999).
390 Wald & Kalicki, supra note 388, at 573 (discussing Brazil's Public-Private
Partnership Law of 2004 and a 2005 amendment to Brazil's Concessions Law allowing
for the use of arbitration to resolve disputes).
391 UNCTAD Report 2011, supra note 319, at 5, 7.
392 LEMOS & CAMPELLO, supra note 383, at 32-33.
393 Id. at 33. In contrast, Brazilian business interests did lobby for the ratification
of double-taxation treaties, of which 24 were successfully approved by Parliament. Id. at
32-33.
394 FILHO, supra note 164, at 5.
395 In 2010, Brazil ranked fifth in the world in terms of inward FDI flows.
UNCTAD Report 2011, supra note 319, at4 fig.I.4.
396 Between 2000 and 2010, Brazil's OFDI stock increased from $52 billion to
$181 billion. See supra Graph 1.
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characterized as multinationals.3 97 Some of these investors have
had to resolve disputes with foreign governments. For example,
the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht contracted to build a
hydroelectric dam in central Ecuador, but the company
encountered structural problems during the construction of the
dam.398 In 2008, Rafael Correa's government terminated four
existing contracts and expelled Odebrecht from the country.3 99 In
2009, Ecuador filed an arbitration claim against Odebrecht before
a domestic tribunal, seeking $250 million in damages.40 0
Similarly, in 2004, Petrobras entered into a concession with the
Bolivian government to develop natural gas fields only to have its
investment nationalized when Evo Morales came to power in
2006.401 Although the Petrobras dispute with Bolivia was
ultimately resolved diplomatically, Petrobras nonetheless
structured its investment so as to take advantage of Bolivia's BIT
397 John Prideaux, A Special Report on Business and Finance in Brazil: Arrivals
and Departures, ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2009), www.economist.com/node/14829517; see
also U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2011: Country Fact
Sheet: Brazil 2 (2011), http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite dir/docs/wir1 1_fs br en.pdf
(listing Petrobras, Vale, and Gerdau among the world's top 100 non-financial
transnational corporations from developing countries in 2010, as ranked by foreign
assets).
398 See generally Jean Friedman-Rudovsky, The Bully from Brazil, FOREIGN POL'Y
(July 20, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/20/
thebullyfrom brazil?page=full (including Odebrecht's dam project as an example of
the Brazilian company's large scale projects in Latin America).
399 C.J. Schexnayder, Big Brazilian Firm Under Fire in Ecuador and Venezuela,
ENGINEERING NEWS REC., Nov. 17, 2008, at 14, available at
http://enr.construction.com/news/finance/archives/08 111 2a.asp.
400 Equador entra com pedido de arbitragen contra Odebrecht, GLOBO.COM (May
5, 2009) http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Economia Negocios/0,,MUL1108926-9356,00-
EQUADOR+ENTRA+COM+PEDIDO+DE+ARBITRAGEM+CONTRA+ODEBRECH
T.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
401 Paulo Prada, Bolivian [sic] Nationalizes the Oil and Gas Sector, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2006, at A9. With over $1 billion invested, Petrobras was the largest foreign
investor affected by the nationalization. Id.
Petrobras was also a target of the Ecuador government's 2007 decision to
"renegotiate" the terms of participation contracts it had concluded with foreign investors
to develop oil reserves. See generally ALDO MUSACCHIO, LENA G. GOLDBERG &
RICARDO REISEN DE PINHO, PETROBRAS IN ECUADOR (Harvard Business School 2009)
(examining as a case study the 2007 essential takeover of Petrobas's production by the
Ecuadorian government).
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with the Netherlands.40 2 In other words, as the community of
Brazil's outward foreign investors grows larger and more
motivated to lobby for investment protections, political conditions
may become more favorable for Brazil to conclude and ratify BITs
or FTAs with investment chapters.40 3
In 2007, the Council of Ministers of Brazil's Chamber of
Foreign Trade (CAMEX) approved guidelines for the negotiation
of certain investment protection agreements, including the
negotiation of FTAs with investment chapters.4 04 Although this
has not yet led to Brazil's conclusion of any agreements, the
government's inaction may be attributable to the fact that it has
been preoccupied with the election and transfer of power to Dilma
Rousseff, who was inaugurated as Brazil's president in January
20 11.405
e. Implications
Although practices have varied, the trend among significant
capital-exporting EMEs, especially India and China, has been to
conclude increasing numbers of BITs and FTAs with investment
chapters. 406  This section briefly considers some implications of
this trend, including the possible impact of EMEs on global BIT
practice.
402 Kalicki & Mederios, supra note 386, at 440.
403 See LEMOS & CAMPELLO, supra note 383, at 36 (suggesting that the recent
emergence of Brazilian multinationals creates a new constituency favoring investment
protection, and may facilitate the future ratification of Brazilian BITs).
404 Id. at 36-37; Luke Eric Peterson & Ana Carolina e Simbes e Silva, Brazil
Mandated to Pursue Limited Range of Investment Protection Standards, INv. ARB. REP.
(Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20091001_35 (subscription required).
405 See Raymond Colitt, Brazil's Rousseff Starts Market-Friendly Transition,
REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/01/us-brazil-election-
idUSTRE69S29F20101101 (noting the recent election and describing the transition into
power of President Rousseff); Brian Winter, Taking Brazil's Helm, Rousseff Nods to
Wall Street, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/03/brazil-
rousseff-idUSN0317199420110103 (discussing Rouseff's priorities in January 2011).
406 See generally U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., South-South Investment
Agreements Prohferating, I IIA MONITOR at 1 (2005) [hereinafter South-South
Investment Agreements], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
webiteiit20061 en.pdf (discussing that investment agreements between developing
countries have increased substantially "in number and geographical coverage" in the last
ten years).
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Not only have EMEs increased their BIT practice, but they are
more frequently concluding BITs and FTAs with each other.407 As
noted above, Russia's recent BIT practice has been almost
exclusively with other EMEs.408 The number of BITs concluded
between developing countries increased fourteen-fold between
1990 and 2004.409 As of the end of 2006, 680 (or about twenty-
seven percent) of the 2500 BITs that had been concluded were
concluded between developing countries. 41 0  Lauge Poulsen
defines "South-South" BITs as BITs concluded between EMEs, a
broader definition that includes transition countries as well as
developing countries. 4 1  By this measure, Poulsen estimates that
South-South BITs account for forty percent of all BITs. 412  A
question to consider is whether South-South BITs are
substantively any different from BITs concluded with or between
developed economies.
A recent UNCTAD study found that, although there were "few
specifically South-South features" noticeable in the body of South-
South BITs, the agreements tend to focus on economic
development concerns more than other BITs. 413  For example,
South-South BITs are less likely to guarantee market access to
foreign investment, focusing instead on protections of existing
investment, and are less likely to expressly prohibit performance
requirements.4 14 Poulsen conducted an empirical analysis of over
300 BITs to determine whether the national treatment and transfer
guarantees of BITs differ when concluded between EMEs. 4 15 He
found that South-South BITs are more likely than North-South
BITs to: (i) restrict or exclude the national treatment obligation
guarantee; and (ii) include exceptions to the transfer of payments
407 See id at 1.
408 UNCTAD Russia BIT List, supra note 370.
409 The number of BITs concluded between developing countries increased from 44
in 1990 to 653 in 2004. South-South Investment Agreements, supra note 406, at 1.
410 Echandi, supra note 53, at 7.
411 Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, The Significance of South-South BITs for the
International Investment Regime: A Quantitative Analysis, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
101, 101 n.2 (2010).
412 Id. at 101.
413 UNCTAD, Recent Developments, supra note 335, at 2.
414 Id.
415 Poulsen, supra note 411, at 112-13.
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guarantee.4 16  These differences, however, are undercut by the
existence of broad "most-favored nation" (MFN) clauses, which
could allow investors to benefit from the more generous
protections contained in other treaties.4" To summarize, there is at
least some evidence to suggest that over time, the growing body of
BITs and FTAs concluded between EMEs may provide a
moderating influence on the substance of the international
investment protection regime.
Similarly, it will be interesting to see how the institution of
investment arbitration and the growing body of investment
arbitration decisions are affected, if at all, when investors from
EMEs are bringing claims. Tza Yap Shum4 18 and Paushok4 1 9 are
examples of claims brought to investment arbitration by investors
from EMEs (China and Russia, respectively). UNCTAD's
investor-state dispute settlement database lists forty-nine disputes
involving claimants from EMEs. 4 2 0 The vast majority of these
disputes were initiated since 2003 .421 Regardless of whether the
nationality of the investor has had any impact on the tribunal's
decision in these cases (most likely it has not), it is nonetheless
significant that EME investors are bringing investment arbitration
claims. The fact that institutions such as ICSID increasingly
adjudicate claims brought by EME investors arguably enhances
the legitimacy of the institution. Similarly, the fact that EME
investors are adjudicating BIT claims likely has affected and will
continue to affect attitudes within EME governments towards
BITs and investment arbitration, just as U.S. attitudes towards
investment arbitration shifted when the United States found itself
on the respondent side of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes.42 2
416 Id. at 118, 123 (noting that South-South BITs are two to three times more likely
to limit or exclude national treatment provisions, and three to four times more likely to
include restrictions on transfer clauses, than North-South BITs.)
417 Id. at 128-29.
418 Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Competence (June 19, 2009).
419 Paushok v. Gov't of Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (UNCIT Arb.
Trib. Apr. 28, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf.
420 UNCTAD Investor-State Database, supra note 381.
421 Forty-three of the 49 claims have been brought since 2003. Id.
422 Defending against investor claims has also prompted the U.S. State Department
to approach the international law of investment protection in new ways. For example,
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Finally, it remains to be seen whether pending U.S. BIT
negotiations with India and China will be successful and, if so,
how the content of these BITs will compare with the 2004 Model
BIT. Negotiations with both countries stalled in 2009 pending the
Obama Administration's review of the U.S. Model BIT,
although there are reports that BIT negotiations with India have
resumed.42 4 India's general approach to BITs may be even more
investor protection-oriented than that of the United States.4 25  As
for China, there remain important differences between U.S. and
Chinese BIT practices. Most importantly, the U.S. Model BIT
grants investors national treatment with respect to the
"establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments."4 2  In
contrast, Chinese BITs only grant investors protection post-
establishment, and only "in accordance with its laws and
regulations."4 27 In other words, Chinese BITs, like those of other
EMEs, either limit or do not afford national treatment to foreign
investors.4 28 At the same time, however, recent Chinese BITs have
borrowed innovations from the U.S. 2004 Model BIT with respect
to other core BIT protections. The 2006 China-India BIT defines
indirect expropriation using language very similar to Annex B of
the 2004 Model BIT. 429 The fair and equitable treatment provision
of the 2008 China-Mexico BIT borrows liberally from Article 5 of
only after defending against NAFTA Chapter 11 claims such as Loewen did the State
Department begin emphasizing the opinio juris requirement in defining customary
international law. VANDEVELDE, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 65-66.
423 Tsui, supra note 208, at 1246; Expert: China's Push to Invest Abroad May Aid
Effort to Discipline SOEs, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 1, Jul. 21, 2011.
424 See supra note 366, and accompanying text.
425 As discussed, India's BITs provide rigorous protections to foreign investors.
See Ranjan & Raju, supra note 360, at 7; see also Prabhash Ranjan, Tread Cautiously on
Bilateral Investment Treaties, HINDU Bus. LINE (Nov. 25, 2009),
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/article 1070187.ece
(describing Indian BITs as being drafted solely from the perspective of investment
protection, and noting the absence in the preamble to Indian BITs of reference to other
sovereign objectives).
426 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, art. 3(1).
427 Cai, supra note 343, at 470 (internal citations omitted).
428 See Poulsen, supra note 411, and accompanying text.
429 Cai, supra note 343, at 478 n.120; see also 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, at
Annex B.
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the 2004 Model BIT.43 0  Finally, the 2008 China-New Zealand
FTA's investor-state dispute settlement provision incorporates
several innovations from the 2004 Model BIT.43 1 In dramatic
contrast to the 1980s, when U.S. and Chinese BIT practices stood
at two ends of a spectrum, 43 2 their practices have converged
significantly over the past two decades.
Similarly, since 2005, China has been in negotiations with
Australia over an FTA that includes an investment chapter.433 The
issue of investor-state dispute settlement may prove to be
particularly difficult in these negotiations, since the Australian
government released a statement in 2011 announcing that it will
discontinue including investor-state dispute resolution procedures
in trade agreements.43 4 Jiirgen Kurtz suggests that, in light of the
"massive" amounts of Chinese FDI invested in Australia and
legitimate concerns regarding Australia's past treatment of
Chinese investors, it is quite possible that China will insist that any
FTA between them include a provision for investor-state dispute
settlement.435 It is indeed ironic that the country that is most likely
to insist on a treaty commitment to arbitrate investor-state disputes
is not Australia, but China.
IV. Conclusion
Greece, in an effort to conclude the largest debt restructuring
in history, recently enacted legislation that retroactively inserts
collective action clauses into debt instruments governed by Greek
law.4 36 If Greece invokes the collective action clauses in order to
430 Cai, supra note 343, at 469 n.58; see also 2004 Model BIT, supra note 194, art.
5. Note that the treaties' respective definitions of customary international law differ.
431 Id. at 481.
432 When the United States and China engaged in BIT negotiations during the
1980s, the two sides "disagreed on nearly all critical issues," and talks were suspended in
1988. Id at 486-87.
433 See Jirgen Kurtz, The Australian Trade Policy Statement on Investor-State
Dispute Settlement, 15(22) ASIL INSIGHTS (Aug. 2, 2011),
http://www.asil.org/insights10802.cfm.
434 Id. (quoting Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading Our Way to




436 Matina Stevis, Greek Deal Looks Good To Go, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2012,
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conclude the restructuring, it is quite possible that creditors
adversely affected by such action may allege that Greece has
violated its BIT obligations.4 37 However, of the thirty-nine BITs
Greece currently has in force, all but two were concluded with
either EMEs or formerly Socialist countries.43 8 It is likely that
when concluding these treaties, the Greek government did not
anticipate that it might find itself defending against investor
claims.
As the Greek example illustrates, although the international
investment regime used to be characterized as manifesting an
"unbalanced" relationship between North and South, this
characterization no longer reflects reality.43 9 With the relatively
recent and dramatic growth in economic power of the BRICs and
other EMEs, the line between capital-importing and capital-
exporting countries continues to blur. As a consequence, the
dynamics of BIT negotiation have become more complex. Ever
since it began defending against arbitration claims brought by
Canadian investors under NAFTA Chapter 11, the United States
no longer negotiates BITs with the sole objective of protecting its
own investors.4 40 These new dynamics should continue to have a
moderating influence on the content of new BITs and FTA
investment chapters.
Although these dynamics have affected and will affect the
11:54 A.M.), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2012/03/06/greek-deal-looks-good-to-go. A
collective action clause allows for modification to key payment terms in a debt
instrument with only a supermajority vote. See generally Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu
Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317 (2002) (discussing
the use and characteristics of English majority action clauses).
437 See, e.g., Daniella Strik, Proposed Greek Collective Action Clauses Law May
Trigger Its International Law Obligations, KLUWER LAW INT'L,
http://kluwer.practicesource.com/blog/2012/proposed-greek-collective-action-clauses-
law-may-trigger-its-international-law-obligations (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (discussing
the impact of collective action clauses on Greece's existing BIT agreements).
438 U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Total Number of Bilateral Investment
Agreements Concluded: Greece (June 1, 2012), http://unctad.org/
Sections/ditepcbb/does/bitsgreece.pdf. The list includes a 1963 BIT concluded with
Germany, a significant capital-exporter and home to significant creditors of Greece. Id.
The remaining developed countries on the list are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Id.
439 Echandi, supra note 53, at 5-6; see also Alvarez, supra note 19, at 16.
440 See Kenneth Vandevelde, Model Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Way
Forward, 18 Sw J. INT'L LAW 307, 309-310 (2011).
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content of future investment protection agreements, much of the
investment protection regime is based on the 1857 BITs that were
concluded during the 1990s or earlier."' Most BITs are "sticky,"
meaning they generally remain in effect for a ten- or fifteen-year
term, and subsequently may remain in effect indefinitely unless
one of the parties provides written notice of termination.44 2 Even
if a BIT is terminated or renegotiated after its term expires, the
BIT's protections typically will remain in effect with respect to
existing investments for an additional period.443  Even as BIT
practice evolves, previous generations of treaties will remain in
effect for some time.
As for the United States, it is increasingly likely to find itself
in the position of host to foreign investors that enjoy protections
under BITs and FTA investment chapters. Within the past decade,
the United States concluded FTAs with Singapore and Korea, two
of the world's most significant EME capital exporters.4 44 If the
pending Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations are successful, the
United States could end up party to a multilateral investment
protection agreement with eight or more countries, including
capital exporters Australia, Singapore and Malaysia. 445  Most
441 UNCTAD, Quantitative Data, supra note 65, tbl.1.
442 See, e.g., U.S.-Arg BIT, supra note 38, arts. XIV(1)-(2) (providing for an initial
10-year term; subsequently, treaty will remain in force indefinitely until either party
provides one-year's written notice of termination); see also SALACUSE, supra note 11, at
351.
443 See, e.g., US-Arg. BIT, supra note 38, arts. XIV(I)-(2) (providing that upon
termination, treaty will remain in effect for an additional 10-year period with respect to
existing investments); see also SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES supra note 11,
at 351-52 (stating that most "continuing effects" clauses are effective for an additional
10, 15 or 20 years).
444 Singapore FTA, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta (last visited
Oct. 8, 2012); U.S. Korea Free Trade Agreement, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta
(last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
445 Gantz, Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations, supra note 208. Canada,
Mexico, and Japan may join the negotiations as well. Peter Menyasz, Daniel Pruzin &
Amy Tsui, Canada, Mexico Invited to Join TPP Talks, Expected to Enter Negotiations in
Early Fall, 29 BNA INT'L TRADE REP. 1004 (Jun. 21, 2012).
Although the negotiations are ongoing, the Trans-Pacific Partnership most likely
will not be concluded until 2013 or later. Gantz, Trans-Pacific Partnership
Negotiations, supra note 208. Additionally, in light of Australia's recent Trade Policy
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significantly, the United States may conclude BITs with China and
India in the not-so-distant future. Although differences remain,
the respective negotiating positions of the United States versus
India and China with respect to investment protection are
significantly closer today than one might have imagined just a
decade ago.
Statement, see Kurtz, supra note 433, it is quite possible that Australia will seek to
exclude investor-state dispute settlement from the agreement, at least with respect to its
own obligations.
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